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Abstract 
“Say on pay” reforms have been advocated and implemented 
in many major jurisdictions over the last decade, including the US 
and UK.  Singapore and Hong Kong, however, which are recognized 
by the World Bank to have the second- and fourth-best regulatory 
systems in the world for investors to do business in respectively, have 
bucked the international trend of allowing shareholders a binding or 
advisory vote on the remuneration of corporate managers.  “Say on 
pay” has either been rejected or ignored in the latest round of 
reforms to the corporate governance codes in Singapore and Hong 
Kong despite studies which have found that they have the highest 
executive pay in Asia, with base salaries for top executives rising to 
more than 25% higher than their US counterparts.  Could this be the 
curious case of “Asian values”? 
While Singapore and Hong Kong share the same common law 
legal traditions with the US and UK within the same bucket of liberal 
market economies (LMEs), as the “Varieties of Capitalism” 
framework would suggest, they may be said to practice a different 
form of “regulatory capitalism” from their Anglo-American 
counterparts under their corporate governance regimes.  This article 
looks at the institutions of political economy within Singapore and 
Hong Kong, and how they may explain this variance in “say on pay” 
regulation between jurisdictions.  It argues that this may be attributed 
to a complex combination of institutional factors such as Singapore 
and Hong Kong’s distinctive patterns of corporate ownership, the 
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relative restraint of institutional investors, the role of the state and 
ultimately the socio-political culture and ethos within a non-Western 
liberal democratic framework.  It concludes with what the 
implications of this variance may be for future legal reforms on “say 
on pay” and theories of corporate governance in the broader 
context—namely, why are certain legal reforms not adopted in 
certain jurisdictions, and if adopted, how effective are such reforms 
likely to be? 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Executive remuneration lies at the heart of current discussions 
on corporate governance reforms, which have driven the regulatory 
diffusion of “say on pay” reforms in many major jurisdictions over 
the last decade, including the US and UK.1  Excessive payments to 
corporate executives have repeatedly been cited as reasons for many 
corporate failures and remain a highly controversial and politicized 
issue in many countries.  “Say on pay” may be defined broadly as a 
regular mandatory binding or advisory shareholders’ vote on the 
remuneration of the company’s executive directors and/or managers 
as required by law.2  This departs from the established position in 
corporate law, which has generally assigned decision-making power 
on executive remuneration to the board of directors as part of their 
management authority.  As states restructure from the period of neo-
liberalism preceding the global financial crisis in 2008 and take on a 
more interventionist and progressive agenda,3 “say on pay” reforms 
have altered the corporate balance of power under the implicit 
corporate contract between shareholders and managers by according 
shareholders greater say over such remuneration matters.4  Populist 
pressures over executive compensation, which were deemed either 
excessive or misaligned with corporate performance, have further 
transformed this from a corporate governance issue to a broader issue 
on social policy. 5   From this vantage point, society and not just 
shareholders have a stake on the regulation of executive remuneration. 
 
 1 Randall S. Thomas & Christoph van der Elst, Say on Pay Around the World, 92 
WASH. U. L. REV. 653, 659–68 (2015); OECD, OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FACTBOOK 
2019 164–65 (2019), https://www.oecd.org/corporate/Corporate-Governance-Factbook.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CP57-WMKD] [hereinafter OECD FACTBOOK 2019]. 
 2 Thomas & van der Elst, supra note 1, at 658. 
 3 See David Levi-Faur, The Regulatory State and Regulatory Capitalism: An 
Institutional Perspective, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 667–68 (David 
Levi-Faur ed., 2011) [hereinafter Levi-Faur, Regulatory State and Regulatory Capitalism] 
(discusses the concepts of the regulatory state and regulatory capitalism); David Levi-Faur, 
The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. 12, 14 (2005). 
 4 Michael Klausner, The “Corporate Contract” Today, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 84, 86 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 
2018). 
 5 Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Executive Remuneration, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 334, 351 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & 
Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018). 
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Singapore and Hong Kong, however, have bucked the 
international trend of allowing shareholders a binding or advisory 
vote on the remuneration of corporate executives.  In Singapore and 
Hong Kong, “say on pay” has either been rejected or ignored in the 
latest round of reforms to the corporate governance codes. 6  
Nonetheless, studies have found that Singapore and Hong Kong have 
the highest executive pay in Asia, with total guaranteed cash (base 
salaries and total fixed allowances) for top executives in 2016 rising 
to more than 25% higher than their US counterparts.  In 2016, for 
every US$100 that top executives in the US earned in base salary, 
their counterparts in Singapore and Hong Kong made US$132 and 
US$128 respectively.7  Despite their recognition by the World Bank 
to have the second- and fourth-best regulatory systems in the world 
for investors to do business in respectively, along with a higher score 
on the shareholder rights index as compared with the US, 8  the 
conspicuous absence of “say on pay” reforms in Singapore and Hong 
Kong in comparison with the leading Western jurisdictions9 presents 
an interesting anomaly for examination.  One may recall the earlier 
debate on “Asian values” as the supposed antithesis to Western 
norms,10 when “Confucian capitalism” became the rallying call in 
many East Asian economies in the late twentieth century. 11  
Singapore was one of the most forceful proponents of “Asian values”, 
 
 6 HKEX, CONSULTATION CONCLUSIONS: REVIEW OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CODE AND RELATED LISTING RULES (2018), https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-
Market/News/Market-Consultations/2016-Present/November-2017-Review-of-the-CG-
code-and-Related-LRs/Conclusions-(July-2018)/cp2017111cc.pdf?la=en 
[https://perma.cc/E95X-TGH8]; MAS, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE COUNCIL 20 (2018), https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/Regulations-and-
Financial-Stability/Regulatory-and-Supervisory-Framework/Corporate-Governance-of-
Listed-Companies/Consultation-2018-Jan-16/Response-to-consult/Response-paper-on-
Councils-recommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BWX-4SEU]. 
 7 Asia Sees Widening Salaries Gap—Willis Towers Watson Study, WILLIS TOWERS 
WATSON (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en-TH/news/2017/04/asia-
sees-widening-salaries-gap [https://perma.cc/MB47-5N8N]. 
 8 WORLD BANK GROUP, DOING BUSINESS 2019 TRAINING FOR REFORM (16th edition) 5, 
176, 202, 212 (Oct. 31, 2018),  
https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-
Reports/English/DB2019-report_web-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/RNQ7-P8PF]. 
 9 See Thomas & van der Elst, supra note 1. 
 10 Humphrey Hawksley, Asian Values, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/asian-values [https://perma.cc/Q9CZ-G4QE]. 
 11 Teemu Ruskola, Theorizing The Corporation: Liberal, Confucian, And Socialist 
Perspectives, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE CORPORATION 298, 298 (Thomas Clarke et 
al. eds., 2019). 
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and argued that they were preferable to “Western” norms and were 
essential to achieve economic growth.12 
Yet, Asia, notwithstanding the variances amongst themselves, 
may be said to be home to a set of institutions of political economy 
distinct from the West, in particular the US and the UK.13  These 
differences include distinct patterns of corporate ownership and the 
common use of pyramidal or conglomerate holding structures 
amongst group companies, as well as cultural variances within a 
diverse range of economic, legal, and political systems at different 
levels of market development.14  They may be said to practice a 
different form of “regulatory capitalism” 15  from their Anglo-
American counterparts under their corporate governance regimes, 
despite being ostensibly in the same bucket of liberal market 
economies (LMEs), as the “Varieties of Capitalism” framework 
would suggest.16 
Following North’s definition as a starting point, 
“[i]nstitutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic, and social interaction.”17  Institutions, therefore, 
are devised by rule-makers to impose constraints on and shape the 
incentives of rule-takers.  Regulatory capitalism theory posits that 
governance and regulation are manifestations of the underlying 
institutions of political economy and how they determine policy 
outcomes in the capitalist order.18  This implies different regulatory 
outcomes for societies with different structures of political economy.  
Governance, as defined by the World Bank, is “the process through 
 
 12 Meng Seng Wee & Dan W. Puchniak, Derivative Actions in Singapore: Mundanely 
Non-Asian, Intriguingly Non-American and at the Forefront of the Commonwealth, in THE 
DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 323, 353 (Dan 
W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012). 
 13 OECD, OECD SURVEY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS IN ASIA 5 
(2017), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/OECD-Survey-Corporate-Governance-Frameworks-
Asia.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QJ4-VWPJ] [hereinafter OECD SURVEY 2017]. 
 14 See OECD, REFORM PRIORITIES IN ASIA: TAKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TO A 
HIGHER LEVEL (2013) 13–16, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/reform-priorities-in-
asia_9789264204416-en#page1 [https://perma.cc/T7JX-4MXA] [hereinafter REFORM 
PRIORITIES IN ASIA] (discussing the corporate governance landscape in Asian countries). 
 15 Levi-Faur, Regulatory State and Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 3, at 668–69. 
 16 PETER A. HALL & DAVID SOSKICE, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE 1, 8–9 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2003). 
 17 Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97 (1991). 
 18 David Levi-Faur, David, From “Big Government” to “Big Governance”, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 4, 14 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012). 
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which state and non-state actors interact to design and implement 
policies within a given set of formal and informal rules that shape and 
are shaped by power.”19  This suggests that corporate governance is 
not homogeneous across time and space, as corporate governance 
systems need to be understood as institutionalized relationships 
amongst the spectrum of social, economic and political actors, the 
different varieties of which informs our search for suitable regulatory 
design and alternatives.20 
In this light, this article adopts an institutional approach and 
explores how the variances in “say on pay” regulations between 
Singapore and Hong Kong on one hand, and the US and UK, on the 
other, may be explained by the differences in the political and 
economic institutions amongst each polity.  Singapore and Hong 
Kong present complex phenomena—both are small entrepôt Asian 
city-states sharing similar colonial common law institutions with the 
US and the UK as hybrids of Chinese and Western cultures.  Yet, they 
are not liberal democracies in the Western sense.  They have 
nevertheless achieved unprecedented success in their institutional 
reforms to benefit from the preceding decades of economic 
globalization.21  Incidentally, despite their strong rule of law and low 
corruption,22 they have been highlighted in The Economist’s crony 
capitalism ranking, which purports to measure the extent economic 
elites with close relations with the government seek to profit by rent-
seeking. 23   Nevertheless, any apparent shortcomings have not 
impeded the sustained economic growth miracles, which have rapidly 
transformed two of Asia’s four “tiger” economies (along with South 
 
 19 WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017: GOVERNANCE AND THE 
LAW 41 (2017), https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017 
[https://perma.cc/54QB-VJ8W]. 
 20 See Dieter Plehwe, Modes Of Economic Governance: The Dynamics Of Governance 
At The National And Firm Level, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 388, 388 
(David Levi-Faur ed., 2012). 
 21 See generally Gordon Redding et al., Hong Kong: Hybrid Capitalism as Catalyst, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS 34, 50 (Michael A. Witt & Gordon 
Redding, 2014). 
 22 See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2019 16 (2019), 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2019-
Single%20Page%20View-Reduced.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9VS-WCHG] (noting that 
Singapore and Hong Kong are ranked 13th and 16th in their rule of law, respectively, behind 
the UK but ahead of the US). 
 23 Planet Plutocrat, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 15, 2014), 
https://www.economist.com/international/2014/03/15/planet-plutocrat 
[https://perma.cc/44F5-VXN3]. 
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Korea and Taiwan) over the last fifty years.  As of 2017, the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX) is the world’s largest stock exchange 
in terms of total value traded as a percentage of GDP and sixth largest 
in terms of market capitalization, with the Singapore Exchange (SGX) 
as the largest amongst medium exchanges in terms of the number of 
IPOs and listed entities. 24   In 2018, the HKEX attracted more 
shareholder capital than either the New York Stock Exchange or 
London Stock Exchange, and led the world in IPO fund-raising.25  
Singapore’s GDP per capita is now higher than that of the United 
States, and it recently topped the US as the world’s most competitive 
economy, with Hong Kong close behind in third place.26  This makes 
Singapore and Hong Kong fascinating subjects of study in corporate 
governance to ascertain the possible reasons for different regulatory 
approaches for apparently common corporate governance problems 
faced in different jurisdictions. 
In this connection, this article critiques the “Varieties of 
Capitalism” theory and other similar orthodox corporate governance 
theories in respect of their applicability to the Asian corporate context, 
which remains understudied despite the growing economic impact of 
Asian companies in the fastest-growing region in the world.27  The 
analysis reveals that further refinement to the existing orthodox 
theories and metrics of corporate governance is needed.  In doing so, 
the author seeks to contribute to the increasing interest in Asian 
models of corporate governance and joins an emerging group of 
corporate law scholars by providing an integrated and contextual 
view of corporate governance on a comparative basis.28  It argues that 
 
 24 OECD FACTBOOK 2019, supra note 1, at 19, 21. 
 25 Takeshi Kihara, Hong Kong Leads World In IPOs For 2018, Driven By Tech Listings, 
NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Dec. 20, 2018, 03:22 AM), 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Hong-Kong-leads-world-in-IPOs-for-2018-
driven-by-tech-listings [https://perma.cc/UN6W-LBDB]. 
 26 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2019 xiii (Klaus 
Schwab ed., 2019),  
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MQY3-QBYK]. 
 27 Kensaku Ihara & Yusho Cho, Asia Is Home To 50% Of World’s Fastest Growing 
Companies, NIKKEI ASIAN REVIEW (May 9, 2019, 2:35 PM), 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/Asia-is-home-to-50-of-world-s-fastest-
growing-companies2 [https://perma.cc/5HPA-N9LW]. 
 28 See generally Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the 
Art and International Regulation, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A 
FUNCTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 3, 3-101 (Andreas M. Fleckner & Klaus J. Hopt, 
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the underlying capitalist institutions of political economy matter, and 
divergence in these institutions can lead to fundamental differences 
in the adoption, trajectory and ultimately, the success of regulatory 
reforms.  It concludes that these insights are critical to understanding 
why “say on pay” reforms are, and are likely to remain, contentious 
issues in Singapore and Hong Kong, and if eventually adopted, are 
unlikely to function in a similar manner as compared to other 
common law jurisdictions.  Such insights may form the basis of 
evaluating other types of corporate governance issues and reforms on 
a comparative basis, and may also yield important insights for other 
Asian jurisdictions. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  Part II sets out the theoretical 
framework of comparative corporate governance, while Part III 
provides an overview of the various “say on pay” reforms in the US 
and UK, along with other jurisdictions.  Part IV examines the 
institutions of political economy within Singapore and Hong Kong 
and how they may explain this variance in “say on pay” regulation 
between jurisdictions.  Part V discusses what the policy implications 
are for Singapore and Hong Kong, and Part VI concludes. 
II. “SAY ON PAY” REFORMS AND THE CAPITALIST 
CONUNDRUM FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The universality of the corporate form, as the fundamental 
pillar of modern capitalism across a variety of jurisdictions, suggests 
that business corporations “face a fundamentally similar set of legal 
problems— in all jurisdictions.”29  From a functionalist perspective, 
economic rationality and efficiency dictate that corporate laws should 
face similar economic pressures for reform towards the same 
objective.30  “Global governance” standards set by organizations such 
as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) have further played an influential role towards harmonizing 
corporate governance reforms at an international level, especially 
 
eds., 2013) (a comparative analysis of economic, legal, and social determinants of corporate 
governance based on reports from thirty-three countries). 
 29 John Armour et al., What is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW—A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 1 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 
2017). These “five basic legal characteristics of the business corporation” are “legal 
personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated management under a board 
structure, and investor ownership.” 
 30 Id. at 4–5. 
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after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998 and the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2007-2008. 31   The G20/OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (2015), for example, prescribes “say on pay” 
as follows: “Shareholders should be able to make their views known, 
including through votes at shareholder meetings, on the remuneration 
of board members and/or key executives, as applicable.  The equity 
component of compensation schemes for board members and 
employees should be subject to shareholder approval.”32 
Since “say on pay” was first introduced in the UK in 2002, 
there has been a remarkable diffusion of such reforms in countries 
including the US, Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland.33  Although 
the trend might, at first sight, suggest regulatory convergence, there 
are in fact a range of different forms of “say on pay” providing for 
varying levels of stringency and shareholder power.  Regulatory 
variances demonstrate “partial convergence” and “divergence-
within-convergence” and adoption appears to be more prevalent in 
the US and EU member states, compared to emerging market 
economies.34  According to the OECD’s 2019 survey, 51% of 49 
countries surveyed have adopted “say on pay” on remuneration 
policy, but there are wide variations amongst them, including whether 
the shareholders’ vote is binding or advisory and the scope of such 
approval.  Countries are also divided on whether to require or only 
recommend “say on pay,” even though there is a continued trend 
toward increased disclosure of company remuneration policy and 
remuneration levels.35 
Singapore and Hong Kong represent two such anomalies, 
where high compensation is often justified as a commercial decision 
to attract talent to the company notwithstanding controversies arising 
from time to time due to directors being rewarded with excessive 
remuneration despite poor corporate performance. 36   While the 
 
 31 Jeffery N. Gordon, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Law and Governance, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 28, 32 (Jeffery N. 
Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018). 
 32 OECD, G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 21 (2015), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HQA3-MTC8] [hereinafter OECD PRINCIPLES 2015]. 
 33 Thomas & van der Elst, supra note 1, at 655, 658. 
 34 Gordon, supra note 31, at 43–44. 
 35 OECD FACTBOOK 2019, supra note 1, at 128–30. 
 36 See HKEX, CONSULTATION PAPER ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE LISTING 
RULES RELATING TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES 130 (2002), 
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OECD considers “say on pay” to have been adopted in other Asian 
countries such as China, Japan, and South Korea, the exact forms in 
which such regulations take and are implemented in practice require 
more detailed examination.  In South Korea, for example, 
shareholders can set the aggregate amount available for board 
remuneration, but decisions concerning the remuneration of 
individual directors and senior management are often delegated to the 
board in practice.37  In Japan, shareholder approval is only required 
when there is a change in aggregate board compensation and 
shareholders routinely approve such requests.38  In China, aggregate 
board remuneration is approved by the shareholders but they are not 
able to propose remuneration structures or policies, and shareholder 
voting is in any event perfunctory in the presence of prevalent 
concentrated ownership structures.39 
These international regulatory developments may be better 
understood when evaluated in the broader context of the respective 
corporate governance framework and the wider environment beyond 
the corporation—which together encompass different varieties of 
capitalism.  In this regard, North adds that, “[i]nstitutions are not 
necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, 
or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those 
with the bargaining power to devise new rules.”40  In this sense, 
regulatory reform requires a political consensus between the state and 
its key stakeholders, in particular political and corporate elites, with 
the former concerned about political accountability and economic 
growth and the latter concerned about their stakes in and success of 
 
https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-Market/News/Market-Consultations/Before-
2005/corporate-governance-issues.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/D3RR-E3VV] [hereinafter 
HKEX CONSULTATION PAPER 2002]. 
 37 Jang Hyuk Yeo, Kyung Chun Kim & Ho Joon Moon, Lee & Ko, Corporate 
Governance in South Korea, LEXOLOGY (July 5, 2019), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a48c6ebf-af0b-48f5-80ea-85ea920e8313 
[https://perma.cc/UV55-5G83]. 
 38 Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 316 (Japan); Sean McGinty & 
David Green, What Shareholders in Japan Say about Director Pay: Does Article 361 of 
Japan’s Companies Act Matter?, 13 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 87, 88–89 (2018). 
 39 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa (中华人民共和国公司法) [Company Law 
of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Oct. 26, 2018, effective Oct. 26, 2018), art. 38(2); Lin Lin, Regulating Executive 
Compensation in China: Problems and Solutions, 32 J.L. & COM. 207, 247 (2014). 
 40 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 16 (1990). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss2/2
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their firms.41  The distribution of power within the firm amongst the 
principal players within the corporation—shareholders, managers 
and employees—are thus affected by their interaction with the state’s 
political economy though political institutions, ideologies and 
interest groups. 42   How each capitalist economy’s institutions of 
political economy negotiate these contradictions within the existing 
predilections of its corporate governance framework determines the 
regulatory outcome. 
A. “Say On Pay” and the Disruption of the Traditional 
Corporate Governance Model 
The economic disruption brought by the period of neo-liberal 
globalization leading to the global financial crisis and its fallout has 
led to the disruption of the traditional corporate governance model.  
“Say on pay” has come at a time when a fundamental reconfiguration 
of the corporate governance model is under way in many jurisdictions, 
largely as a reaction to the alleged failure of corporate governance at 
financial institutions in the run-up to the global financial crisis and 
partly due to political overreaction from populist pressures in the 
aftermath.  Many aspects of these reforms remain contentious, and 
their efficacy and implications are not completely understood.  As 
Bainbridge states, “say on pay” is “part of the ‘disintegrating erosion’ 
of particular exceptions,” by which “director primacy is slowly being 
undermined.” 43   The board’s traditional prerogative to decide on 
executive remuneration is a consequence of what is a de jure 
“shareholder primary” model but a de facto “director primacy” model 
that exists in many common law jurisdictions, including the US, 
Singapore and Hong Kong, insofar as the board is charged with the 
default responsibility of managing the business and operations of the 
company. 44   This primacy accorded to managerial power had 
 
 41 Mark J. Roe & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Introduction, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE 
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1, 2–3 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J Roe eds., 2004). 
 42 Mark J. Roe & Massimiliano Vatiero, Corporate Governance and Its Political 
Economy, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 56, 57 (Jeffrey N. 
Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018). 
 43 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
135 (2012) (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)). 
 44 For example, Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law states that 
the “business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the board of 
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of 
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coincided with the expansion of globalization and the retreat of the 
state in its involvement with private markets and economic 
governance in the preceding decades.  Competition for increasingly 
mobile capital has forced the state to create an attractive pro-investor 
environment through pro-business labor laws and a permissible tax 
and regulatory system.45 
1. “Say on pay” and Shareholder Empowerment 
Modern corporate governance theory credits Berle and Means 
with tracing the problem of the risk of corporate opportunism arising 
from the ceding of control by shareholders to professional managers 
over the operations of public corporations.  This “produces a 
condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may, 
and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly 
operated to limit the use of power disappear.”46  In this context, the 
shift towards shareholder power through the spate of “say on pay” 
reforms are representative of the broader movement toward greater 
shareholder democracy, which shareholder activists in the US have 
long lobbied for to ensure better alignment between shareholder and 
managerial interests.47  The OECD Principles, thus, state: 
Shareholders also have an interest in how 
remuneration and company performance are linked 
when they assess the capability of the board and the 
 
incorporation” (8 Del. C. 1953). Similarly, the Singapore Companies Act provides that “[t]he 
business of a company shall be managed by, or under the direction or supervision of, the 
directors” (Cap. 50, Rev. Ed. 2006), § 157A(1)). Hong Kong’s Model Articles for Public 
Companies states that “the business and affairs of the company are managed by the directors, 
who may exercise all the powers of the company” subject to the Companies Ordinance and 
the articles. See Companies (Model Articles) Notice, L.N. 77 (2013), B2217, §2(1) (H.K.), 
https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/2013/ln77!en [https://perma.cc/5YVK-P6NC]. 
 45 Richard W. Carney & Michael A. Witt, The Role of the State in Asian Business 
Systems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS 538, 539 (Michael A. 
Witt & Gordon Reddings eds., 2014). 
 46 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1933). See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES 
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 574–575 (1776) (noting that “[t]he directors of such companies, 
however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot 
well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which 
the partners in a private co-partnership frequently watch over their own”). 
 47 Fabrizio Ferri, Say on Pay, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 319, 
322 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015). 
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qualities they should seek in nominees for the board.  
The different forms of say-on-pay (binding or 
advisory vote, ex ante and/or ex post, board members 
and/or key executives covered, individual and/or 
aggregate compensation, compensation policy and/or 
actual remuneration) play an important role in 
conveying the strength and tone of shareholder 
sentiment to the board.48 
Apart from the adoption of “say on pay,” recent US 
developments include the controversial reforms of proxy access to 
give shareholders stronger rights in the nomination of directors in 
contested board elections and the increasing use by institutional 
investors of private ordering as a “self-help” mechanism to attain 
stronger participatory rights.  This has shifted the dynamic between 
boards and shareholders, which are increasingly engaged in what Hill 
labels “private ordering combat.”49  Prior to the advent of “say on 
pay,” executive compensation had previously been viewed as a 
fiduciary duty problem, but was reinterpreted as an issue of 
misalignment of managerial and shareholder interests.  Under this 
paradigm, pay-for-performance became a self-executing corporate 
governance solution to a corporate governance problem to incentivize 
management to align its interests with those of shareholders and to 
maximize shareholder value. 50   The US—which has traditionally 
accorded shareholders with the weakest decision rights amongst 
common law jurisdictions—thus became the forerunner in actively 
encouraging incentive compensation plans such as stock option 
plans.51  While this was considered to be an economically efficient 
solution under an “optimal contracting approach,” Bebchuk and Fried 
 
 48 OECD PRINCIPLES 2015, supra note 32, at 22. 
 49 Jennifer G. Hill, The Trajectory of American Corporate Governance: Shareholder 
Empowerment and Private Ordering Combat, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 509, 530 (2019). 
Cheffins argues, however, that while shareholder passivity may be less common than before, 
it is important not to overstate the extent to which managerial discretion will continue to be 
circumscribed in the foreseeable future: BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, THE PUBLIC COMPANY 
TRANSFORMED 344–46 (2018). 
 50 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives: It’s Not How Much You Pay, 
But How, HARV. BUS. REV. (May–June 1990), https://hbr.org/1990/05/ceo-incentives-its-
not-how-much-you-pay-but-how [https://perma.cc/J8UD-NLH2]. 
 51 John Armour et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders 
as a Class, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW—A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 50, 66 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2017). 
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subsequently argued that such an approach was untenable as 
managerial power and rent extraction are likely to have an important 
influence on the design of compensation arrangements and the 
dilution of shareholder value, not least because of the risk of board 
capture which militates against the chances of arm’s length 
bargaining. 52   On this basis, executive compensation is a 
manifestation of, rather than a solution to, the agency problem.53  This 
view was relied upon by the House of Representatives in 2007 in 
enacting the Dodd-Frank Act, which introduced “say on pay” in the 
US in 201154.  The structuring of executive compensation was thus 
reconceptualized post-financial crisis, when it was recognized that 
there were inherent problems with pay-for-performance as a means 
of aligning managers with the longer-term interests of shareholders.  
Share options were deemed to have an asymmetrical risk profile, with 
the incentives created by share-based payments varying significantly 
depending on factors such as the vesting periods and prices, which 
could lead to either excessive risk taking or risk aversion.55  In an 
empirical study by Geiler and Renneboog, many remuneration 
agreements were found to be ineffective and promoted managerial 
self-dealing and profit skimming. 56   Singapore, amongst other 
jurisdictions, was cited as subject to a high risk of skimming and less 
efficient remuneration contracting due to the high levels of variable 
pay and comparably weak disclosure standards.57 
However, a conflicting image of shareholders pervades much 
of contemporary US corporate law scholarship on “say on pay,” 
which remains highly controversial.  Bainbridge, for example, argues 
that “say on pay” reforms are counterproductive as effective 
corporate governance requires that decision-making authority be 
 
 52 LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 23–44 (2004). See also Marianne 
Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded For Luck? The Ones Without 
Principals Are, 116 QUART. J. ECON. 901, 903–929 (2001) (using a “skimming model” and 
finding that CEO “pay-for-luck” is as much as pay-for-performance especially in poorly 
governed firms). 
 53 Ferri, Say on Pay, supra note 47, at 330. 
 54 H.R. REP. NO. 110-88, at 3–5 (2007). 
 55 OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BOARD PRACTICES: INCENTIVES AND GOVERNING 
RISKS 37 (2011), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/49081438.pdf [https://perma.cc/DH4Y-
LNP5]. 
 56 Philipp Geiler & Luc Renneboog, Managerial Compensation: Agency Solution or 
Problem, 11 J. CORP. L. STUD. 99, 138 (2011). 
 57 Id. at 125. 
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vested in a small, discrete central board rather than in a large, diffuse 
shareholder electorate, given the information asymmetries and 
collective action problems that lead most shareholders to be rationally 
apathetic.58   Gordon also cautions that the burden of scrutinizing 
executive pay at thousands of corporations particularly by 
institutional investors would lead to outsourcing of voting decisions 
to proxy advisors, which in turn would promote “one size fits all” 
standardized guidelines that would hurt firm value.59  Consistent with 
the concern of investor short-termism, former Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of Delaware Strine states that increasing shareholder 
power would leave boards increasingly subject to the “immediate 
whims of stockholders.” 60   “Say on pay” may also serve as a 
shareholder vote on the company’s short-term share performance 
rather than on its long-term value.61 Such concerns still persist as the 
effects of “say on pay” reforms still remain inconclusive to date. 
2. “Say on pay” and Stakeholder Influence 
Perhaps the biggest shift in the corporate governance model, 
in which “say on pay” may be placed in the broader context, is not 
the shift from “managerial capitalism” to “shareholder capitalism,” 
but the growing trend toward a form of “accountable,” “collective” 
or “enlightened” capitalism insofar as broader non-shareholder 
stakeholder interests are increasingly taken into account in corporate 
decision-making. 62   In 2015, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) adopted a final rule pushed by labor unions 
pursuant to section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires 
public companies to disclose the ratio of the compensation of its chief 
executive officer (CEO) to the median compensation of its employees 
 
 58 Stephen M. Bainbridge, “Say on Pay” Justified?, 32 REGULATION 42, 47 (2009). 
 59 Jeffrey N. Gordon, Say On Pay; Cautionary Notes On The U.K. Experience And The 
Case For Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 323, 325, 353 (2009). 
 60 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding 
of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761,787–88, 792 (2015). 
 61 Jill Fisch et al., Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The Impact of Firm Performance, 8 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101 (2018). 
 62 What Companies Are For, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/08/22/what-companies-are-for 
[https://perma.cc/N73W-TE6M]. 
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from 2018 unless excluded.63  This shift towards a more stakeholder-
oriented approach has arisen as the pursuit of shareholder value is 
increasingly perceived to have produced negative economic 
outcomes, including the surge in income inequality, depressing 
wages and a fall in workers’ share in firm value, which have 
contributed to a decline in social mobility.64 In this regard, the SEC 
noted that, the pay ratio disclosure “provides an informational benefit 
to shareholders in their say-on-pay voting.”65  The rule may also be 
understood as an attempt to assist workers in their bargaining 
positions in wage negotiations rather than as a strict metric for 
measuring corporate performance.66  Such developments challenge 
the traditional de jure “shareholder primary” model characteristic of 
companies in common law jurisdictions such as the US and the UK, 
as opposed to the stakeholder model more prevalent in civil law 
jurisdictions in continental Europe.67 
Previously, corporate governance was viewed predominantly 
as the mechanism of the ordering of private interests through the 
“legal fiction” of the corporation, “which serves as a nexus for a set 
of contracting relationships” 68  through corporate hierarchies, as 
argued by neo-institutional economists, 69  that was structured in a 
 
 63 SEC, Pay Ratio Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. Parts 229 & 249 (2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9877.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G56-MPR5]. 
 64 Id. at 178. 
 65 Id. at 175–76. 
 66 John Armour et al., The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and 
Non-Shareholder Constituencies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW—A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 80, 89, 94 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2017). 
 67 Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, An International Corporate Governance 
Index, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 97, 114 (Douglas Michael 
Wright et al. eds., 2013). The “shareholder primacy” model posits that as shareholders are 
the primary beneficiaries of the company, directors should exercise their duties in the 
shareholders’ interest to maximize shareholder value. In contrast, the stakeholder model 
requires directors to take into account not only shareholders’ interests, but the interests of 
other stakeholders which may affect or be affected by the company, including employees, 
creditors, customers, suppliers and the wider community. See Shelley Marshall & Ian 
Ramsay, Corporate Purpose, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE CORPORATION 168, 169 
(Thomas Clarke, et al. eds., 2019) (discussing the “shareholder primacy” model and the 
stakeholder model as an alternative). 
 68 Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976), which drew on 
Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 21 AER 777 (1972). 
 69 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, 
MARKETS AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985) 68–84. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature 
of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388–89 (1937) (arguing that the distinguishing characteristic 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss2/2
238 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 15 
 
preferably “non-interventionist” framework of legal rules. 70   The 
financial crisis, however, upended such assumptions that 
underpinned corporate governance as critics argued that shareholder 
value in the limited sense and private ordering might not in fact be 
the best means of promoting efficiency and corporate responsibility, 
and the mechanisms used to ensure management accountability might 
not have been effective as previously thought.71  The steep rises in 
executive compensation and income inequality witnessed during the 
earlier winner-takes-all capitalist culture have been well-
documented. 72   Entity shielding, coupled with the separation of 
ownership and control, in a limited liability corporation were 
understood to have produced agency costs by increasing conflicts, not 
simply between shareholders and managers, but also between 
shareholders and broader stakeholders, by providing a vehicle for 
externalizing the costs of corporate plundering to involuntary 
creditors.73  The risk of opportunism and rent-seeking by managers 
though excessive executive compensation thus came at the expense 
of not just shareholders but creditors and employees as well, affecting 
social welfare as a whole.74  In the wake of the financial crisis, there 
was broad concern that by tying executive compensation to short-
term returns, remuneration packages in financial institutions had 
contributed to the system’s collapse by encouraging managers to take 
excessive risks from a social standpoint, which contributed to the 
moral hazard of the state bailout of failing banks.  Bebchuk has thus 
 
of the firm is “the supersession of the price mechanism” which is replaced with “vertical” 
integration or the power of the “entrepreneur-coordinator,” who directs the allocation of 
corporate resources). 
 70 Peer Zumbansen, Governance: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 84, 91 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012). See John C. Coffee Jr., The 
Political Economy Of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be Frustrated And 
Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1024–25 (2012). 
 71 See generally P.M. Vasudev & Susan Watson, Introduction, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 1, 1–5 (P.M. Vasudev & Susan Watson eds., 
2012) (giving an overview of corporate governance practices following the financial crisis). 
 72 See generally Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 
OXF. REV. ECON. POL’Y 283 (2005) (examining the growth of US executive pay during 1993-
2003). 
 73 Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1907, 1917–26 (2013). 
 74 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 
247, 274–75 (2010) (explaining that corporate governance reforms aimed at aligning 
executive pay arrangements with the interests of banks’ common shareholders are not 
socially desirable). 
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argued that enhanced regulation of remuneration in financial 
institutions is justified on the basis of moral hazard considerations, 
not least because systemic failure of such institutions imposes 
substantial costs on taxpayers.75 
Others like Lipton, however, argue that it was shareholder 
pressure that led to short-termism in the first place.76  Shareholders 
were blamed in the Walker Review in the UK for acquiescing in or 
encouraging poor board practices to boost returns on equity, which 
“was not necessarily irrational from the standpoint of the immediate 
interests of shareholders who, in the leveraged limited liability 
business of a bank, receive all of the potential upside whereas their 
downside is limited to their equity stake, however much the bank 
loses overall in a catastrophe.” 77   As Coffee argues, institutional 
shareholders, being diversified and having limited liability, are less 
risk adverse than managers about corporate insolvency.  To “correct” 
the managerial tendency toward risk aversion, shareholders might 
have been willing to accept even imperfect compensation structures 
to induce managers into accepting greater risk.78 
Corporate governance reforms post-crisis have therefore been 
premised on the need to align managerial preferences with not simply 
the interests of shareholders but broader stakeholders.  This, however, 
creates a potential tension between this broader, public approach and 
the focus on shareholder power under the “say on pay” reforms.79  
Consequently, the regulation of executive remuneration and 
corporate governance in general has evolved to a focal point of public 
interest through increasing political pressure exerted on the 
 
 75 Id. at 255–74; Lucian A. Bebchuk, How to Fix Bankers’ Pay, 139, DAEDALUS 52, 53 
(2010);  
Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns 
and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 273–76 (2010). 
 76 Martin Lipton, The Proposed “Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009”, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 12, 2009) 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/05/12/the-proposed-shareholder-bill-of-rights-act-of-
2009 [https://perma.cc/ACM2-4D3J]. 
 77 SIR DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND 
OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 71–72 (HM Treasury 
2009), https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf [https://perma.cc/CWB3-YBYK]. 
 78 Coffee, The Political Economy Of Dodd-Frank, supra note 70, at 1052–53. 
 79 Jennifer G. Hill, Regulating Executive Remuneration After the Global Financial 
Crisis: Common Law Perspectives, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE PAY 219, 233 
(Randall S. Thomas and Jennifer G. Hill eds., 2012). 
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corporation from broader corporate stakeholders (or “outsiders”) 
through the invocation of broader societal interests.80 
B. Varieties of Capitalism and Regulatory Choices 
This brings into question whether overpaid managers are a 
distinctly American or Western problem.  While CEO pay levels in 
the US notoriously outpace the rest of the world, this is arguably a 
common corporate governance problem faced by many advanced 
economies, including Singapore and Hong Kong.  According to the 
Bloomberg Global CEO Index 2017, the highest paid CEOs may be 
found in the following countries and regions in the following order: 
US, Switzerland, Netherlands, UK, Canada, Germany, Australia, 
Spain, Hong Kong and Singapore.  According to data compiled by 
Bloomberg, the return on equity for Singapore shareholders from 
2009 to 2016 at large companies for every thousand dollars paid to a 
director is just 0.5%, which trailed the US and UK (at 0.8% and 1.5% 
respectively).81  A study of the annual reports of 541 listed companies 
on the SGX observed weak pay-for-performance sensitivity between 
Singapore CEOs’ remuneration and corporate profitability, with 21% 
paying bonuses despite incurring losses and 32% paying larger 
bonuses when the firm’s profits had declined.  The same study also 
found that unlike US companies, only 11% of the companies 
surveyed utilized long-term incentive plans as part of total executive 
compensation.82  A similar study of the annual reports of 233 Hong 
Kong listed firms also found weak pay-for-performance alignment, 
with only 15% of the companies surveyed utilizing long-term 
incentive plans to incentivize CEOs to act in the firm’s long-term 
 
 80 See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION (2019), 
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/BRT-Statement-
on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-with-Signatures-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQB2-5RCP]. 
Moving away from shareholder primacy, the “corporate purpose” has been redefined by the 
influential Business Roundtable in its new Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation signed 
by 181 CEOs, who have committed to deliver value for the benefit of all stakeholders—
customers, employees, suppliers, communities and shareholders. 
 81 Andy Mukherjee, Singapore Boards Are Killing Value, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 8, 2016, 
12:00 AM) https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2016-04-08/singapore-boards-are-
killing-value [https://perma.cc/56BX-ACKM]. 
 82 Korn Ferry Report: Pay Flat, Long-Term Incentives Utilization Low For Singapore 
CEO’s, KORN FERRY (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.kornferry.com/press/korn-ferry-report-
pay-flat-long-term-incentives-utilization-low-for-singapore-ceos [https://perma.cc/2EHR-
9R6R]. 
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interest. 83   According to the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade 
Unions, income inequality between corporate managers and frontline 
employees is also widening.84  One would argue from conventional 
theory that the liberalization of capital markets should serve as a force 
for regulatory convergence. 85   On this premise, regulators in 
Singapore and Hong Kong—as developed financial hubs competing 
for listings—should support robust financial markets by taking heed 
of shareholder interests and ensuring that the corporate and securities 
legal framework minimizes the inefficient allocation of corporate 
resources through misaligned executive remuneration.  Yet, 
notwithstanding the broad similarities in the corporate governance 
frameworks with listed companies in the US and the UK, the apparent 
regulatory inertia in adopting “say on pay” reforms in Singapore and 
Hong Kong calls for a deeper examination of their underlying 
institutional factors.  It also calls into question the often-criticized 
“law matters” hypothesis that argued that common law jurisdictions 
provide stronger shareholder protection than civil law countries, 
which contributed to more developed capital markets and strong 
economic growth, in view of the spate of “say on pay” reforms in the 
latter particularly the amended Shareholder Rights Directive II 
introduced in the European Union.86 
In this regard, the “Varieties of Capitalism” theory sets out a 
broad framework within which different models of corporate 
governance may be analyzed.  Firms may be seen as manifestations 
of their managers behind the corporate veil seeking to exploit 
“dynamic capabilities” and overcome coordination problems through 
the firm’s relationships with its primary financiers—shareholders—
and broader stakeholders, particularly employees.  In liberal market 
economies (LMEs), firms coordinate their endeavors primarily 
 
 83 Benjamin Robertson, Performance Not A Factor In Hong Kong CEO Pay Scale, 
Study Finds, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 24, 2014, 2:19 AM), 
https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/1412167/performance-not-factor-hong-
kong-ceo-pay-scale-study-finds [https://perma.cc/4CKH-QSY9]. 
 84 Jada Nagumo, Asia’s Highest Paid CEOs Trump US Execs In Pay Rankings, NIKKEI 
ASIAN REVIEW, (Dec. 19, 2018), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-trends/Asia-s-
highest-paid-CEOs-trump-US-execs-in-pay-rankings [https://perma.cc/JTT7-N2VB]. 
 85 MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAW 327–335 (2008). 
 86 Thomas & van der Elst, supra note 1, at 658; Rafael La Porta et al., Legal 
Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FINANCE. 1131, 1132, 1137–39 (1997); Rafael La 
Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POLIT. ECON. 1113, 1139 (1998). See also Holger 
Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 THE REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 
467, 483 (2010) (critiquing the “law matters” theory). 
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through hierarchies and competitive market arrangements, while in 
coordinated market economies (CMEs), firms rely more heavily on 
non-market relations supported by public and private regulatory 
arrangements.87  This broadly corresponds with the Anglo-American 
common law shareholder primacy model and the continental 
European civil law stakeholder-oriented model. 88   A further 
important leitmotif in the “Varieties of Capitalism” literature is the 
influence of path dependent complementarities in each capitalist 
model.  Each model’s institutions evolve from the initial status quo 
in a path dependent manner to a “coordinated structure of 
complementary institutions driven by choices based on 
supermodularity and complementarities,” which shape the likelihood 
and nature of change for future institutions.89 
A key characteristic of corporate governance, as observed by 
Bebchuk and Roe, is its embeddedness in domestic legal systems, in 
particular, in patterns of corporate ownership and interest group 
dynamics.  In consequence, notwithstanding the internationalization 
of “global governance” standards, the rate and extent of convergence 
of legal reforms are constrained by the forces of path dependency 
along two distinct dimensions which are mutually reinforcing.90  First, 
from an efficiency perspective, initial conditions or “institutional 
complementarities” in a particular system, along with sunk adaptive 
costs, network externalities, endowment effects, and multiple optima, 
can lead the system of political economy and its corporate structures 
down a specific path. 91   Second, the initial rules and corporate 
structures would have had distributional effects affecting the 
resources of incumbents in the political process.92  Existing corporate 
structures and institutional complementarities, which have developed 
to adapt to these structures, determine the relative efficiency of the 
 
 87 HALL & SOSKICE, supra note 16, at 8. 
 88 Sigurt Vitols, Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the UK, 
in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE 337–360 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). 
 89 Ronald J. Gilson, From Corporate Law to Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 3, 13 (Jeffery N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg 
Ringe eds., 2018). 
 90 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence of Corporate 
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 130–31 (1999). 
 91 Id. at 153. 
 92 Id. at 157–59; ROE & GORDON, supra note 41, at 13. 
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set of rules to be adopted and maintained.93  This favors the status 
quo, creating rents that incumbents would fight to preserve, making 
it difficult to reform existing institutions to conform to the 
“international” model by increasing the transition costs of doing so.94  
In this regard, an empirical study suggests that managers were not 
merely passive rule-takers of regulatory reforms and had previously 
lobbied rule-makers to avoid fuller disclosure of their compensation 
through the mandatory expensing of stock option compensation due 
to concerns about public scrutiny of their compensation.95 
The structural differences in the institutional political 
economy between LMEs and CMEs would suggest different 
regulatory strategies to resolve the issue of overpaid executives and 
the market failure of social inequality.  In this respect, one would 
think that LMEs would rely more heavily on market forces to regulate 
executive remuneration. This, however, would not adequately 
explain the adoption of “say on pay” reforms by the US and UK 
(LMEs) and continental European states such as Germany and France 
(CMEs).  At the same time, “say on pay” is consistent with a 
shareholder-centric approach toward corporate governance that is 
prevalent in LMEs.  The thrust of “say on pay” reforms is less of 
direct government intervention in executive compensation than to 
reinforce market discipline by enabling better coordination between 
private actors insofar as shareholders, as opposed to the state, will 
have a say on the company’s executive remuneration.96 
At face value, Singapore and Hong Kong are arguably LMEs. 
In international rankings, Hong Kong and Singapore are ranked the 
highest in terms of economic freedom97 and the lowest in terms of the 
burden of government regulation, and they are among the highest in 
pay and productivity and flexibility of wage determination in the 
labor market, ahead of the US and the UK.98  Yet, there exists a wide 
 
 93 Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 90, at 131, 166. 
 94 Gilson, supra note 89, at 9–14. 
 95 Patricia M. Dechow et al., Economic Consequences of Accounting for Stock-Based 
Compensation, 34 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 18–19 (1996). 
 96 See JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES 
BROKEN 202–04, 275–76 (2008). Despite his criticism of shareholder democracy, “say on 
pay” may be seen to be a market-based mechanism, which serves to encourage executives 
to keep their promises to shareholders as Macey advocates. 
 97 THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 2019 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM: COUNTRY 
RANKINGS (2019), https://www.heritage.org/index/ranking [https://perma.cc/MQ6T-76Y9]. 
 98 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 26, at 266–68, 506–08. 
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spectrum of regulatory states and classifying them as either LMEs or 
CMEs does not does not provide us with sufficient granularity and 
precision in evaluating their institutional landscape and the patterns 
of interaction amongst actors in the political economy.  It is necessary 
to regard the regulatory state as a dynamic as opposed to a static 
construct; failure to do so risks oversimplifying regulation, which is 
often a context-dependent socio-political phenomena as much as it is 
a legal one. 99   Other scholars have subsequently developed and 
refined the “Varieties of Capitalism” theory with different 
typologies.100  The “Varieties of Capitalism” theory, thus, only takes 
us halfway—it explains how different regulatory states came to their 
present form but does not fully address how different regulatory states 
may respond to similar challenges differently,101 nor does not account 
for new governance patterns particularly in Asia.102  For example, is 
Singapore’s state-driven capitalism or Hong Kong’s close-knit 
corporate community an LME or CME (or a hybrid)? 
III. OVERVIEW OF “SAY ON PAY” REFORMS 
A. United States 
In response to public concerns about the financial crisis in 
2008, the US Congress placed “say on pay” on its legislative agenda 
and passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.  It 
required bailout recipients under the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) to provide their shareholders with an advisory vote on the 
remuneration of the corporation’s executives in exchange for 
financial assistance.  It also provided for limitations on remuneration, 
a prohibition on golden parachute payments, and claw-backs for 
 
 99 See Karen Yeung, The Regulatory State, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 
64, 75–6 (Robert Baldwin et al. eds., 2010). 
 100 See e.g. ALAN DIGNAM & MICHAEL GALANIS, THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 45–46 (2009); PETER A. GOUREVITCH AND JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER 
AND CORPORATE CONTROL 54–56 (2007) (both discussing the “Varieties of Capitalism” 
theory). 
 101 Gilson, supra note 89, at 13–14. 
 102 See generally Michael A. Witt & Gordon Redding, Asian Business Systems: 
Implications and Perspectives for Comparative Business Systems and Varieties of 
Capitalism Research, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS 668, 684 
(2014). 
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senior executive officers of TARP recipients.103  This was extended 
and made mandatory for public companies by the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 104  which was 
implemented in January 2011 by the SEC.  Specifically, the SEC 
required public companies to conduct a shareholder advisory vote to 
approve the remuneration of the company’s named executive officers 
at least once every three years, and conduct a separate shareholder 
advisory vote at least once every six years to determine how regularly 
the “say on pay” vote should be held.  In addition, companies 
soliciting votes to approve merger or acquisition transactions are 
required to disclose certain “golden parachute” compensation 
arrangements and, in certain circumstances, to conduct a separate 
shareholder advisory vote to approve the arrangements. 105   The 
Dodd-Frank Act also provided for the independence of compensation 
committees and compensation consultants; the recovery of excess 
incentive-based compensation following the material non-
compliance with any financial reporting requirement; and enhanced 
disclosure requirements in respect of employee or director hedging, 
the relationship between executive compensation and the issuer’s 
financial performance, and the ratio of CEO compensation to the 
median compensation of employees, as discussed earlier.106 
B. United Kingdom 
The UK has historically had the most rigorous set of 
governance requirements with respect to executive compensation.  
Since 2002, listed companies have been required to submit a 
Directors’ Remuneration Report to the advisory vote of 
 
 103 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343, § 5221, 122 
Stat. 3765 (2008), https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ343/PLAW-110publ343.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ASM2-4RRW]. 
 104 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1899 (2010), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-
111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf [https://perma.cc/UM3W-DZNR]. 
 105 SEC Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute 
Compensation, 17 C.F.R. Parts 229, 240, 249 (2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9178.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY38-ZV77]. 
 106 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 
§§ 952–955, 124 Stat. 1899 (2010), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-
111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf [https://perma.cc/UM3W-DZNR]. 
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shareholders. 107   Concerns were raised about the efficacy of an 
advisory vote, which led the UK government to legislate a binding 
regime.108  In 2013, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 
was passed, under which shareholders of quoted companies must 
approve the directors’ remuneration policy by ordinary resolution at 
least once every three years and all director payments, including 
payment for loss of office, must be consistent with the policy or 
approved by shareholders if otherwise.109 
In a further shift towards a more stakeholder-oriented model, 
the Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018 was 
introduced, under which UK quoted companies with more than 250 
UK employees would be required to publish the ratio of their CEO’s 
total remuneration to the median (50th), the 25th and 75th quartile 
pay remuneration of their UK employees in their directors’ 
remuneration reports.  Such companies would also have to disclose 
supporting information, including whether the median ratio is 
consistent with the company’s wider employment policies.110  The 
revised Code of Corporate Governance 2018 further provides for 
additional responsibilities for remuneration committees to review 
workforce remuneration and the alignment of incentives and rewards 
with culture, and take these factors into account when setting the 
policy for executive director remuneration. 111   Most notably, to 
encourage engagement with the workforce, it prescribes that the 
company should either have a director appointed from the workforce, 
a formal workforce advisory panel or a designated non-executive 
director (or otherwise explain what alternative arrangements it has in 
place and why it considers them to be effective).112  Most recently, 
the Companies (Directors’ Remuneration Policy and Directors’ 
Remuneration Report) Regulations 2019 extended the scope of the 
 
 107 The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, No. 1986 (Eng.), 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/1986/made [https://perma.cc/NKG9-NZGH]. 
 108 Thomas & van der Elst, supra note 1, at 668. 
 109 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, c. 24 (Eng.), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/24/contents/enacted [https://perma.cc/Q78F-
DXLC]. 
 110 Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018, No. 860 (Eng.), 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2018/860/contents/made [https://perma.cc/97QU-
CSQW]. 
 111 FRC, UK CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2018), §§ 33, 40, 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/2Z56-UB26]. 
 112 Id. at § 5. 
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UK’s existing executive pay framework to cover unquoted traded 
companies as well as quoted companies.113 
C. Australia 
A non-binding shareholder vote on the directors’ 
remuneration report was introduced in 2004 in Australia. 114  
Following concerns that this did not provide shareholders with 
sufficient power or incentives for companies to respond to 
shareholder concerns, the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) was amended 
after the financial crisis to provide for a new “two-strikes and re-
election” process. 115   The “two-strikes” occur when a company’s 
remuneration report receives a “no” vote twice in a row of 25% or 
more of the shareholder votes cast on a resolution that the 
remuneration report be adopted.  This triggers a “spill resolution” to 
be put to shareholders and if shareholders vote in favor of the spill 
resolution, the company’s directors (other than the managing director) 
would be required to stand for re-election within 90 days.116 
D. European Union 
“Say on pay” reforms have also been passed across Europe, 
including France, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and 
Belgium.117  The amended Shareholder Rights Directive II, which 
came into force in 2017, strengthens shareholder power over 
management and seeks to facilitate long-term shareholder 
engagement and encourage greater involvement of and oversight by 
all stakeholders, in particular employees, as part of the company’s 
 
 113 Companies (Directors’ Remuneration Policy and Directors’ Remuneration Report) 
Regulations 2019, No. 970 (Eng.),  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/970/contents/made [https://perma.cc/N9FQ-
WGVK]. 
 114 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 250R (Austl.),  
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017C00328 [https://perma.cc/EL4R-YXJV]. 
 115 Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Bill 2011 (Cth), Explanatory Memorandum Chapter 1 (Austl.), 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2011B00020/Explanatory%20Memorandum/Text 
[https://perma.cc/LB92-M479]. 
 116 Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth) s 250V (Austl.),  
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2011A00042 [https://perma.cc/X8GX-PTZF]. 
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corporate governance.  In its preceding Green Paper consultation, the 
European Commission made the case for greater shareholder 
oversight of corporate remuneration policies by highlighting that 
“[p]oor remuneration policies and/or incentive structures lead to 
unjustified transfers of value from companies, their shareholders and 
other stakeholders to executives”.118  Under the amended Directive, 
each listed company in the European Union (EU) would be required 
to put its remuneration policy for directors to a binding ex ante 
shareholder vote at every material change and in any case at least 
every four years, but member states may provide for the vote on 
remuneration policy to be advisory.119  Companies would be allowed 
to implement a remuneration policy which has been rejected by 
shareholders, but would be required to submit a revised policy at the 
subsequent general meeting. 120   The amended Directive also 
enhanced company disclosure requirements to increase firm 
transparency and director accountability, and to facilitate better 
shareholder oversight over directors’ compensation.  The 
remuneration policy must set out, inter alia, “how the pay and 
employment conditions of employees of the company were taken into 
account” in establishing the remuneration policy, how it contributes 
to the “company’s business strategy and long-term interests and 
sustainability,” and “criteria relating to corporate social responsibility” 
for the award of variable compensation. 121   Companies are also 
required to hold an advisory vote on its remuneration report, which 
must set out the remuneration awarded in the past financial year to 
individual directors, as well as a comparison with the “average 
remuneration on a full-time equivalent basis of employees of the 
company other than directors over at least the five most recent 
 
 118 Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, 
The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions Action 
Plan: European Company Law And Corporate Governance—A Modern Legal Framework 
For More Engaged Shareholders And Sustainable Companies, COM(2012) 740 final 9 (Dec. 
12, 2012), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0740&from=EN [https://perma.cc/7QXE-
79JZ]. 
 119 Directive 2017/828, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 
Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of Long-term Shareholder 
Engagement, O.J. (L 132) arts. 9a–9b, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32017L0828 [https://perma.cc/E5LA-WPNZ]. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
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financial years”. 122   Where the shareholders vote against the 
remuneration report, boards would need to explain in their next 
remuneration report how they have taken into account the shareholder 
vote.  As an alternative to a vote, member states may permit small 
and medium-sized companies to submit the remuneration report only 
for discussion in the annual general meeting instead.123 
E. Singapore 
In its review of the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance 
last year, the Corporate Governance Council noted that the US, UK 
and Australia had introduced “say on pay” reforms.  It decided, 
however, that “say on pay” was “not necessary in the Singapore 
context at this point” and that the primary responsibility to decide on 
compensation should rest with the Remuneration Committee and 
board of directors, despite proponents arguing that it would facilitate 
greater shareholder engagement.124  Instead, it considered that “it is 
more important for companies to provide meaningful disclosures so 
that stakeholders can understand the alignment in the level and 
structure of remuneration to the companies’ long-term objectives, 
business strategy and performance.”125  Curiously, the OECD lists 
Singapore as a jurisdiction with at least one “flexibility” mechanism 
for “say on pay,” and in its 2019 Factbook, as having a requirement 
for shareholder approval on remuneration policy under its listing 
rules.126  In this regard, the SGX Mainboard Rules only requires listed 
companies to disclose in its annual report the remuneration of 
directors and key executives as recommended in the Code of 
Corporate Governance, or otherwise disclose and explain any 
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 123 Id. 
 124 MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE, CONSULTATION PAPER ON RECOMMENDATION 
OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL 17–18 (2018), https://www.mas.gov.sg/-
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deviation from the recommendation. 127   The Code of Corporate 
Governance itself is not binding but applies on a comply-or-explain 
basis.  It provides that the board should develop director and 
executive remuneration packages that are “appropriate and 
proportionate to the sustained performance and value creation of the 
company,” based on the recommendations of the Remuneration 
Committee, the majority of whom are independent directors. The 
company is also required to disclose in its annual report the names, 
amounts and breakdown of  remuneration of each director and the 
CEO, and at least the top five key management personnel in bands no 
wider than S$250,000 and in aggregate. 128   These disclosure 
requirements were not made mandatory pursuant to the 2018 revision 
of the code notwithstanding several studies which have shown that 
these disclosure requirements are usually among the most poorly 
complied provisions of the code.129  The revision, however, enhanced 
the disclosure requirements and provided for the company to set out 
in its annual report the names, relationship and remuneration in bands 
no wider than S$100,000 of employees who are substantial 
shareholders, or are immediate family members of a director, the 
CEO or a substantial shareholder, and whose remuneration exceeds 
S$100,000 during the year.130 
Singapore, however, has a minimal form of “say on pay”: 
director fees must be approved by an ordinary shareholder vote but 
the salary paid to an executive director is usually left by the 
constitution to the board to decide.131  Compensation for loss of office 
or retirement by a director must also be approved by a shareholder 
vote, but this does not include payments that are part of the director’s 
remuneration package.132  In view of these requirements, the Steering 
Committee, in its review of the Singapore Companies Act in 2011, 
took the view that the then-existing requirement for a directors’ report, 
including the requirement to disclose directors’ benefits therein was 
of little value and unnecessary, and recommended its abolishment 
 
 127 SGX, Mainboard Rules, § 1207(12) (Sing.). 
 128 Code of Corporate Governance (6 August 2018), Principles 6–8 (Sing.). 
 129 Chua Wei Hwa, Remuneration Disclosures—Is “Comply-or-Explain” Enough?, 
THE BUSINESS TIMES, (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/hub/boardroom-
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 130 Code of Corporate Governance (6 August 2018), Provision 8.2 (Sing.). 
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despite similar requirements in the UK and Australia. It also removed 
the requirement for shareholder approval where the payment of 
compensation to an executive director for termination of employment 
does not exceed his base salary for the three preceding years.133 
F. Hong Kong 
Hong Kong is listed by the OECD in its 2019 Factbook as a 
jurisdiction that does not require shareholder approval on board and 
key executive remuneration. 134   Listed companies are instead 
required to establish a Remuneration Committee, a majority of which 
must be independent directors.135  Under the Corporate Governance 
Code, which applies on a comply-or-explain basis, the Remuneration 
Committee is responsible for determining the remuneration packages 
of individual executive directors and senior management, or making 
recommendations to the board on their remuneration packages.136  
Unlike Singapore, however, Hong Kong provides for a stronger form 
of “say on pay” and shareholder approval is required under the 
Listing Rules for director service contracts exceeding three years, or 
which require the company to give notice of more than one year or to 
pay compensation or other payments exceeding one year’s 
emoluments to terminate the contract.  The Remuneration Committee 
(or an independent board committee) is required to advise 
shareholders on how to vote, and whether the terms are fair and 
reasonable and in the interests of the shareholders.137  This rule was 
introduced by the HKEX in 2004 in view of concerns about the lack 
of scrutiny of excessive director remuneration that was not 
sufficiently tied to corporate performance. At the same time, the 
HKEX considered that it was inappropriate to impose a shareholder 
approval requirement for the quantum of director remuneration per 
 
 133 MINISTRY OF FINANCE, CONSULTATION PAPER: REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE 
FOR REVIEW OF THE COMPANIES ACT 1–17 (2011), 
https://www.mof.gov.sg/portals/0/data/cmsresource/public%20consultation/2011/Review%
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%20Report%20Complete%202.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y622-HM4W]. 
 134 OECD FACTBOOK 2019, supra note 1, at 164. Cf. REFORM PRIORITIES IN ASIA, supra 
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se.138  A disclosure-based approach instead was considered preferable 
on the basis that “directors’ remuneration is essentially a commercial 
decision of the issuer”, which “should have the flexibility to attract, 
reward and motivate its directors and employees by compensation 
packages that the board considers appropriate.”139  While this rule 
may have the effect as an indirect check on excessive managerial 
compensation (in particular golden parachute payments), it does not 
provide for the manner in which the director’s remuneration itself is 
to be determined and approved under the service contract, nor does it 
serve as a regular shareholder appraisal of the director’s remuneration 
unlike a “say on pay” vote.  In this regard, pursuant to the Model 
Articles, the director’s remuneration under the service contract is 
determined by the board, while his remuneration in respect of this 
office as director is determined by the company at the annual general 
meeting even though it is common for boards in Hong Kong to obtain 
a shareholders’ mandate to authorize the board to decide on the 
latter.140   Under the disclosure-based approach, the Listing Rules 
require that a listed company disclose in its financial statements 
details of its directors’ remuneration on a named basis, along with the 
remuneration of the five highest paid individuals in the company for 
the financial year. 141   The Companies Ordinance also requires a 
company to disclose in its financial statements details regarding 
directors’ pay on a collective basis, 142  as well as to obtain 
shareholders’ approval for certain payments for loss of office, and 
unlike Singapore, for directors’ service contracts that may exceed 
three years as well. 143   The issue of “say on pay” on executive 
compensation was not considered during the consultations prior to 
the new Companies Ordinance passed in 2012.144 
 
 138 HKEX CONSULTATION PAPER 2002, supra note 36. 
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 140 Paul Westover & Karen Lau, Corporate Governance and Directors’ Duties in Hong 
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IV. CAPITALIST VARIATIONS IN INSTITUTIONS OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
This article argues that regulatory variances in the “say on pay” 
reforms adopted by various jurisdictions must be understood against 
the backdrop of the distinctive institutional contexts from which they 
emerged.  Here, the basic features of the corporate model in listed 
companies in Singapore and Hong Kong resemble those in the US 
and UK—these include a one-tier board made up of executive and 
non-executive, and independent directors elected by shareholders and 
responsible for monitoring the management in the best interests of the 
shareholders, and the presence of remuneration, nomination and audit 
committees.  There, however, the similarities end.  It is argued that 
the absence of “say on pay” reforms in Singapore and Hong Kong 
may be attributed to broader institutional factors such as their 
distinctive patterns of corporate ownership, the relative reticence of 
institutional investors, the role of the state and ultimately the socio-
political culture and ethos within a non-Western liberal democratic 
framework. 
A. Managerial Power and Shareholding Patterns 
As of 2019, the Anglo-American model of the diffusely-
owned firm is not prevalent in Asia even with improvements in 
minority shareholder protection.  Instead, there is a proliferation of 
different forms of ownership concentration, in particular family 
ownership through cross-shareholdings and pyramidal structures, and 
state ownership. 145   In contrast with the prevalence of dispersed 
shareholdings in the US and the UK, whereby no single shareholder, 
or affiliated group of shareholders, is capable of exercising control,146 
companies in Singapore and Hong Kong have a large concentration 
of ownership.  “Say on pay” is consequently less important as a 
means of mobilizing shareholder opposition against high executive 
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 146 Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FINANCE 471, 
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remuneration in Singapore and Hong Kong.  As de facto control is 
concentrated in the hands of block shareholders, which can 
effectively monitor and discipline self-serving managers, agency 
costs are lessened with less of a separation of firm ownership and 
control.147  Legal controls on executive remuneration are, in turn, less 
important and executive pay levels may be constrained more 
effectively.148 
In contrast, shareholder monitoring of executive remuneration 
is less effective where shareholdings are dispersed in a Berle-Means 
corporation as shareholders suffer from the collective action problem 
with information and coordination costs, and are unlikely to see 
substantial individual gains from a potential reduction in executive 
pay.149  In this regard, dispersed ownership is traditionally cited as 
the reason why performance pay was implemented in the first place 
in order to promote alignment between managerial and shareholder 
interests (at least in theory).  However, the economic inefficiency of 
setting executive remuneration arising from board capture in practice 
in a dispersed ownership context is itself why “say on pay” was 
subsequently introduced, as well as to resolve the collective action 
problem faced by dispersed shareholders.150 
One may have a better understanding of the significance of 
the introduction of “say on pay” reforms in the US when they are seen 
in the historical context of US corporate governance.  The historical 
dispersed nature of ownership in US corporations and ambivalence 
toward shareholder participation rights contributed to the primacy 
accorded to managers in corporate decision-making.  In comparison 
with the more shareholder-centric UK and other common law models, 
including Singapore and Hong Kong’s, US shareholders have 
traditionally possessed far fewer corporate governance rights than 
their foreign counterparts, where such rights are often guaranteed by 
legislation.151  Under Delaware law, for example, shareholders have 
restricted rights on calling special meetings, removing directors and 
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2004). 
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initiating charter amendments, which suggest that shareholder 
interests are not equated with corporate interests in the way that they 
are in the UK (or Singapore or Hong Kong).152  US federal proxy 
rules were historically less concerned with managerial agency costs 
than the risk that a group of shareholders would gain control to the 
detriment of the firm’s shareholders in general, which led to rules that 
restrained coordination attempts amongst shareholders and 
insurgents seeking to gain control through proxy contests.153  The 
traditionally dispersed retail-oriented pattern of shareholdings in US 
corporations, Roe argues, is a product of its history of populist 
politics, which led to policies purporting to fragment institutional 
control of industrial enterprise. 154   This insulated much of board 
activity from shareholder interference, rendering shareholders 
“spectators” rather than “participants.”155  Consequently, “say on pay” 
was introduced to correct this imbalance between strong managerial 
power and weak shareholder power and the consequent perceived 
agency costs which led to excessive executive compensation. At the 
same time, the historical nature and path dependence of “director 
primacy” in the US also explains why such reforms are likely to 
remain contentious in the US, along with broader reforms toward 
shareholder empowerment and participation in corporate 
governance.156 
Singapore and Hong Kong challenge the presumption of the 
dispersedly-held Berle-Means corporation as the zenith of efficiency 
and the end of history.157  The power which block shareholders hold 
is greater than what “say on pay” and other shareholder protection 
regulation in the US and UK purport to confer on dispersed 
shareholders, which are designed to overcome their collective action 
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problem.158  This arguably accounts for the lack of traction of “say on 
pay,” as with other American mechanisms for shareholder power.  
Singapore and Hong Kong are similar insofar as public companies 
are dominated by families and the state as controlling shareholders.  
Both share a common recent trend towards greater shareholder 
concentration than dispersal,159 with the recent introduction of dual-
class share structures possibly perpetuating this further.160  About 75% 
of listed companies on the HKEX in 2012 had a dominant shareholder, 
such as an individual/family or state-owned entity, which owned at 
least 30% of the issued shares.161  Tracking ownership patterns in the 
largest 200 publicly traded companies based on market capitalization, 
Carney and Child found that 55.1% remained under family control in 
2008, compared with 68.3% in 1996.162  Another empirical study 
found that the 10 wealthiest families in Hong Kong owned over 47% 
of the total market capitalization of the HKEX in 2000.163  It was also 
found that 53% of all listed companies had one shareholder or one 
family group of shareholders owning at least 50% of the issued 
capital, with the board of directors owning at least a third of all shares 
in over 85% of listed companies.164  Similarly, the majority of listed 
companies in Singapore had a block shareholder of 15% or more of 
issued shares in 2016.165  Amongst the 100 largest firms in Singapore 
in 2007-2008, 69 are family-owned firms with the control block 
 
 158 See Wee & Puchniak, supra note 12, at 365–68. 
 159 DAVID C. DONALD, A FINANCIAL CENTRE FOR TWO EMPIRES: HONG KONG’S 
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578 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S Thomas, 2015). 
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REUTERS (June 26, 2018, 6:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/sgx-
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holding an average percentage of shares of 69.52%.166  A separate 
study with a larger sample size of 692 companies listed on the SGX 
in 2010-2011 found that 421 companies (or 60.8% of the sample size) 
comprised family-owned companies.167  It revealed that the top five 
shareholders owned 65.9% of the family firm, compared to 62.7% in 
a non-family firm.168  While shareholder protections Singapore and 
Hong Kong are often ranked amongst the strongest in Asia,169 the 
persistence of concentrated ownership amongst families and the state 
is a key reason why their corporate governance has been argued to 
lag behind those of other high-income common law jurisdictions such 
as the US, UK and Australia.170 
In Hong Kong, there is also an increasing number of mainland 
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 171   Since 1993, Chinese 
SOEs have listed “H-shares” in Hong Kong and, as of 2012, comprise 
approximately 11% of the listed companies and over 20% of the 
HKEX market capitalization. 172   Similarly, the Singapore 
government maintains substantial ownership of corporatized SOEs 
(i.e. government-linked companies (GLCs) and real estate investment 
trusts) through its holding company, namely, Temasek Holdings, in 
which it is the sole equity shareholder.173  From 2008 to 2013, GLCs 
accounted for 37% of the SGX’s market capitalization.174  Block 
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Constraining Self-Dealing in Concentrated Ownership Structures, 23 SING. ACAD. LAW J. 
890, 892 (2011). 
 167 DR MARLEEN DIELEMAN ET AL., SUCCESS AND SUCCESSION: A STUDY OF SGX-LISTED 
FAMILY FIRMS 8 (2011),  
https://bschool.nus.edu.sg/Portals/0/images/CGIO/Report/Asian%20Family%20Business%
20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG8M-MC5S]. 
 168 Id. 
 169 ASIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ASSOCIATION, CG WATCH 2018 3 (2018), 
https://www.acga-asia.org/cgwatch-detail.php?id=362 [https://perma.cc/Z5L6-LH9G]. 
 170 See Richard W. Carney, Singapore: Open State-Led Capitalism, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS 193, 200 (Michael A. Witt & Gordon Redding eds., 
2014). 
 171 S.H. Goo & Yu-Hsin Lin, Hong Kong, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 151, 156 (Bruce Aronson & Joongi Kim eds., 2019). 
 172 DONALD, supra note 159, at 58–59 (2014). 
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shareholders may tolerate or approve of compensation practices 
where they are perceived to be consistent with shareholder value 
maximization particularly when they manage the firms they control 
and set the level of their own compensation or that of their affiliated 
directors.  Depending on the circumstances, however, the presence of 
concentrated ownership brings with it different agency problems, 
namely the risk of the expropriation of minority shareholder interests 
arising from conflicts of interest with the majority shareholders. 
B. Institutional Shareholder Activism 
Arguably, a stronger factor accounting for the advent of “say 
on pay” reforms in the US and UK is the rise of institutional 
shareholder activism, which is less commonly witnessed in Singapore 
and Hong Kong.  While ownership structures in the US, UK, Canada 
and Australia still remain relatively dispersed, concentrated 
ownership is making inroads, with growing portfolio investment by 
institutional investors (i.e. pension funds, mutual funds, money 
managers, insurers, investment banks, commercial trusts, endowment 
funds, hedge funds, and private equity).  This has led to increased 
shareholder activism which has been argued to be instrumental in the 
adoption of “say on pay” reforms175 as institutional investors seek 
better alignment between executive remuneration and the long-term 
performance of the company.176  In the US and UK, the twenty largest 
institutional owners on average hold more than 30% of issued capital 
in listed companies.177  Institutional shareholder ownership in the top 
1,000 US corporations has increased from below 10% in the early 
1950s to over 70%.178  In the UK, institutional shareholder ownership 
has historically been high and individual investors now hold only 
about 10% of listed shares, with the remainder held by institutional 
investors. 179   Institutional investor ownership is also increasingly 
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important in Australia, where the introduction of a compulsory 
private pension system in the early 1990s had contributed to a marked 
increase in financial intermediaries.180  A recent OECD study about 
ownership in companies from 54 jurisdictions that together represent 
95% of global market capitalization found that four main categories 
of investors dominate shareholder ownership of today’s publicly 
listed companies—institutional investors, public sector owners, 
private corporations, and strategic individual investors, with the 
largest category being institutional investors, which hold 41% of 
global market capitalization. 181   With shareholding patterns 
continuing to evolve, the OECD notes that the traditional concepts of 
dispersed and concentrated ownership “may no longer be sufficient 
as a basis for understanding and adapting corporate governance 
frameworks to the more complex landscape of corporate ownership 
structures in place around the world.”182 
In principle, broader shareholder ownership by institutional 
investors would assist shareholders to overcome the costs of 
collective action in monitoring management, even though 
institutional investors vary considerably in their capacity and 
economic incentives to do so.183  In this regard, the adoption of “say 
on pay” in the US was precipitated in part by growing institutional 
shareholder activism in the wake of the dot-com bubble burst and 
a series of prominent governance and accounting scandals (such as 
Worldcom and Enron).  These scandals spurred many institutional 
investors to take on a more active role in shareholder monitoring, 
catalyzing a new wave of shareholder activism.184  Since 2006, 
shareholder activists led by union pension funds had submitted 
shareholder proposals to adopt “say on pay” at hundreds of US 
companies in an endeavor to induce voluntary or mandatory broad-
based adoption of “say on pay.”185  Further factors contributed to 
the reconcentration of shares from retail investors to institutional 
investors, including low cost diversification, retirement savings plans, 
tax benefits and a more permissive regulatory environment, which 
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facilitated institutional investors’ voting of portfolio shares and 
greater shareholder participation that altered the balance of power 
between shareholders and managers.186  For example, since 2003, the 
SEC has required investment advisers exercising voting authority 
over client proxies to exercise their voting rights in the best interests 
of clients in accordance with their fiduciary duties and disclose their 
proxy voting policies. 187   An important trend has been the 
proliferation of stewardship codes following the financial crisis188 
drafted on the premise that institutional investors “as ‘universal 
owners’ with broad economic exposure” should exercise their 
decision rights to ensure accountability to their beneficiaries and to 
promote the interests of society as a whole as stewards of the public 
good.189 
Under this premise, institutional investors are given a quasi-
regulatory role with respect to executive compensation by serving as 
a valuable check and balance on managerial power in a dispersed 
ownership context in accordance with their evolving stewardship 
roles. 190   These developments have encouraged shareholder 
 
 186 See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1907, 1917–26 (2013) (concluding that as a result of these factors, the US is 
“nowadays much less of a poster child for managerialist corporate law than in the past”). 
 187 SEC, Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. Part 275 (2003). 
 188 See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 2 (2012), 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b603-3d24b2f62c5f/UK-
Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf [https://perma.cc/U3UH-E22A] (Stewardship 
codes originated in the UK with the issue of the UK Stewardship Code in 2010 by the 
Financial Reporting Council). See also Jennifer G. Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise 
of International Stewardship Codes, 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 497, 506–07 (discussing 
stewardship codes around the world). 
 189 See Armour et al., The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-
Shareholder Constituencies, supra note 66, at 97. See e.g. Martin Lipton et al., It’s Time To 
Adopt The New Paradigm, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ 2, 16 (Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.26357.19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G8ZH-JEEB]; JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND 
LONG-TERM DECISION MAKING: FINAL REPORT 74 (2012), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d
ata/file/253454/bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HP8S-4U9L]; Commission Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance 
Framework, at 2, COM (2011) 164 final (May 4, 2011), https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-
detail/-/publication/3eed7997-d40b-4984-8080-31d7c4e91fb2/language-en 
[https://perma.cc/SG6Q-XLGS] (all emphasizing that institutional investors have a duty to 
promoting societal interests). 
 190 Executive Compensation and Say on Pay, EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
INSTITUTE, https://ecgi.global/content/executive-compensation-and-say-pay 
[https://perma.cc/2P2K-XZLB] (last visited October 22, 2019). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
2020] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 261 
 
participation at both US and foreign portfolio firms and led to a new 
industry of governance intermediaries (including Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis, the two dominant 
global proxy advisers). 191   These proxy advisers have been 
implicitly granted significant influence by regulators in shaping 
corporate governance policies in US public corporations and have 
played an important role in ensuring pay-for-performance alignment 
in their voting recommendations to institutional investors.192 
While institutional shareholders are on the rise in Singapore 
and Hong Kong as well, with institutional investors contributing to 
55% of total market turnover on the HKEX in 2018,193 institutional 
shareholder activism remains rare and primarily an Anglo-American 
phenomenon (and not without its critics).194  Institutional shareholder 
activism and private ordering are generally effective only in firms 
with dispersed ownership structures, given that they have little 
prospect of challenging incumbent boards that are in the hands of 
controlling shareholders.195  The typical activist in Hong Kong owns 
a stake of less than 5% of the company’s equity and has to rely on 
solidarity with other shareholders in order to engage with 
management.  Such activists would therefore face the same collective 
action problem of dispersed shareholders in monitoring 
management.196  For this reason, the introduction by the Hong Kong 
Securities and Futures Commission of the “Principles of Responsible 
Ownership” based on the UK Stewardship Code has been argued to 
have little effect in spurring engagement on the part of institutional 
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shareholders. 197   While investment by Hong Kong’s mandatory 
pension schemes in the domestic stock market has increased over the 
years, such investment still forms a small proportion of their total 
equity investment.  With just HK$2 billion on average for each 
pension fund scheme constituting less than 1% of market 
capitalization on the Hang Seng index, such schemes have been 
argued to have little bargaining power in influencing corporate 
governance.198   Institutional shareholder activism is perhaps even 
rarer in Singapore, with the market for proxy advisory firms still at a 
nascent stage,199 coupled with a government policy that goes against 
the grain by requiring funds managed by the sovereign wealth fund 
GIC to be invested overseas instead of Singapore companies. 200  
Retail investors, fund managers and institutional investors which held 
shares via a nominee company or custodian bank had faced a 
regulatory barrier to shareholder engagement as they were previously 
prevented from attending shareholders’ meetings due to the limit in 
the number of proxies at shareholder meetings, and were effectively 
disenfranchised.201  This limitation was only removed in 2016.202  
Hedge fund activism is also almost non-existent in Singapore. 203  
Further reasons often cited for the lack of shareholder monitoring 
include the passivity of shareholders with a short-term trading 
mentality and an Asian market etiquette that discourages outright 
conflicts between shareholders and managers.204  That is not to say 
that shareholder activism never takes place; rather, it usually occurs 
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on an ad hoc basis privately between minority and controlling 
shareholders or by way of extraordinary publicity campaigns to gain 
public support where these private engagements fail.205  That many 
of these institutional investors are foreign are also likely to hinder 
their effectiveness as an interest group and reduce the chances that 
investor-oriented laws like “say on pay” are enacted.206 
C. Socio-Political Culture and Role of the State 
While arguably akin to LMEs in an economic sense, Hong 
Kong and Singapore have been described as distinct from the 
standard Western liberal democratic model207 and defined by their 
“corporatist” structures.208  In such circumstances, one may assert 
that Singapore and Hong Kong are more insulated from populist 
pressures to curb executive remuneration, wherein institutions may 
be designed with a view to broader economic interests and with it, the 
interests of corporate elites (i.e. controlling shareholders and 
managers) in particular.  Socio-political and cultural norms against 
excessive executive remuneration and income inequality have served 
as a catalyst for pay reforms in the West. Social democracies and left-
wing parties with a stronger sense of egalitarianism and distributional 
concerns played a role in the introduction of “say on pay” reforms in 
Europe.209  More significant is that even with LMEs such as the US 
and UK, the populist movements and public pressure arising from the 
global financial crisis have compelled legislatures to constrain board 
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power in setting executive pay.210  Despite its historical antipathy 
toward “socialism” (as used here in the broad sense), the recent 
primary debates have revealed how populist pressures have moved 
the Democratic Party’s center of gravity to the left, with a greater 
emphasis on the role of the state in regulating market economies, 
protecting the weakest sectors of society, reducing poverty and 
inequality under the capitalist framework, and strengthening labor 
unions.211  This parallels similar historical developments in Europe, 
and is in stark contrast with the traditional deregulated, everyone-for-
himself, free-market American model, which had contributed to 
economic development in the US since the 1950s. 212   Where 
concentrated ownership and affiliated managers are prevalent, as in 
the cases of Singapore and Hong Kong, however, entrenched 
incumbents within the firm can project their influence into the body 
politic to resist new regulations which would undermine their 
autonomy, perpetuating a path dependent political economy. 213  
Well-connected blockholders have been argued to be “an economic 
asset for firms in a politicized environment, to the extent that these 
‘owners’ have more legitimacy and resources to protect their 
companies from political intervention than mere managers backed by 
dispersed shareholders could muster.”214 
In this connection, it is difficult to classify Singapore and 
Hong Kong as strictly LMEs or CMEs. Hong Kong’s corporate sector 
is defined by enterprises owned in tight social and familial networks 
that have cultivated longstanding relationships with the local and 
global banking networks for capital.215  While its stock markets are 
well-developed, Singapore’s capital markets are more oriented 
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towards bank lending as compared with the US.216  The “Varieties of 
Capitalism” hypothesis fails to account adequately for the role of the 
state and the type of democracy within the capitalist system 
concerned.217  Both Singapore and Hong Kong are relative outliers 
which favor pro-business policies coupled with ownership 
concentration by family groups and the state.  While their respective 
governments have been instrumental in building strong regulatory 
frameworks for investment and business-friendly institutions, Hong 
Kong remains a bastion of laissez-faire capitalism218 while Singapore 
is characterized by its state-driven capitalism. 219   Singapore’s 
capitalist system therefore owes its fundamental characteristics to the 
economy’s strong reliance on and deep ties to foreign capital and 
business.220  While this would ordinarily lead to stronger pressures on 
the state to demonstrate credible commitments to international 
standards of best practice, including strong protections for 
shareholders, this is militated against by the pre-existing dominant 
structural ownership by families and the state in listed entities.221 
Both may therefore be said to have a “hybrid” capitalist model.  
Both polities also rank relatively low in terms of income inequality, 
with Singapore—which has not introduced a minimum wage—
ranking among the bottom 10 countries in the world for its efforts to 
reduce inequality.222  The structural nature of income inequality in 
Hong Kong is rooted in its political environment, with its complex 
historical and political relationship with China,223 which has been 
argued to allow for disproportionate influence by corporate and 
economic elites, notwithstanding the democratization agenda 
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provided by the “One Country Two Systems” framework under its 
Constitution, the Basic Law.224  Hong Kong adds a new dimension to 
the vexed issue of the role of business in politics in a capitalist society.  
It has been reported that the support of business elites is pivotal to the 
Chief Executive’s election, with half of the seats in the legislative 
council reserved for specific sectors or industries comprising interest 
group constituencies representing predominantly business 
interests.225  With effective veto power over the group of directly 
elected lawmakers, these functional representatives have been 
contended to have the ability to impede policies which might affect 
business interests, with the result that the Hong Kong’s governance 
has continued to be distinctively pro-business in its outlook. 226  
Further, the interests of controlling shareholders or families 
representing the most powerful groups in Hong Kong are said to be 
further promoted by political connections, and the Hong Kong 
government has been often criticized for being too close with 
powerful vested business interests.227 
It is argued that any attempt to incorporate broader 
stakeholder (in particular, employee) interests in the design of 
remuneration packages, including imposing similar requirements for 
listed companies to disclose the ratio of the remuneration of key 
executives to the remuneration of employees, is unlikely in view of 
the existing structural frameworks in Singapore and Hong Kong’s 
industrial relations.  Such reforms do not cohere well with 
Singapore’s consensus-driven policy of tripartism, which refers to the 
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collaboration amongst labor unions represented by the National 
Trades Union Congress (NTUC), employers represented by the 
Singapore National Employers Federation, and the government.228  
Tripartism was instituted during Singapore’s stage as a 
developmental state to guard against industrial strife, and manage 
labor costs and labor-management relations to secure a key 
competitive advantage for Singapore.  This enabled the government 
to intervene in the labor market through the regulation of manpower 
planning, wage determination and skills upgrading. 229   Under 
Singapore’s tripartite framework, the National Wage Council—a 
tripartite body consisting of representatives of employers, trade 
unions and the government—conducts annual deliberations to forge 
a “national consensus” on salary and related matters.  On the basis of 
the tripartite consensus reached during the deliberations, it issues 
annual guidelines on wage-adjustment recommendations, taking into 
account public views and factors such as “productivity growth, 
employment situation, international competitiveness, and economic 
growth and prospects.”  These guidelines are relied upon as a 
reference point by companies in determining salary increments for 
their employees.230  In Hong Kong, labor relations are described as 
“quiescent” and collective bargaining generally takes place only with 
respect to the few large and prominent organizations. 231  Pay issues 
in Singapore and Hong Kong are dealt with against a highly fluid 
labor market, with the World Economic Forum’s latest Global 
Competitiveness Report ranking them amongst the highest in terms 
of hiring and firing flexibility.232  Under such frameworks, there is 
arguably less room for stakeholder interests in their corporate 
governance models than the US and UK. Singapore and Hong Kong’s 
CEO pay-to-average income ratio also trails the US and UK, which 
further militates against the likelihood of such reforms.233 
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D. Corporate Culture and Confucian Capitalism 
Studies increasingly affirm culture as an institution in itself, 
which can exert substantial influence on corporate decision-making.  
Cultural values between different jurisdictions may influence the 
level of acceptance or acquiescence of managerial remuneration 
packages, including the appropriate structure and amount of such 
packages, independent of the legal regime.234  Cultural orientations 
manifest themselves in the design of executive agreements, levels of 
compensation, social tolerance for economic inequality and attitudes 
in general toward remuneration disclosure. 235   While “Asian 
values”—the notion that East Asia’s economic success in the nineties 
was attributed to its culture of Confucianism—was largely 
discredited after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997,236 it is argued that 
they have proven their resilience in the important role they play in 
Singapore and Hong Kong’s corporate culture.  In this connection, it 
is interesting to note from history an important white paper released 
by Singapore during the height of the “Asian values” debate, which 
purported to set out a set of “Shared Values” by which Singaporeans 
could live by.  The paper highlighted, inter alia, that unlike the West, 
“Singapore is an Asian society” that “has always weighted group 
interests more heavily than individual ones” and where issues are 
resolved “through consensus instead of contention.” 237   As 
importantly, the paper also noted that family is “the basic unit of 
society” and “[m]any Confucian ideals are relevant to Singapore,” in 
particular, the “strictly hierarchical” nature of [t]raditional Confucian 
family relationships,” albeit noting that “the Confucian concept of 
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family ties” had historically “led to nepotism.” 238  Employing the 
terminology advanced by Hofstede and Schwartz, 239  corporate 
culture in neo-Confucianist societies with Chinese ethnic majorities 
such as Singapore and Hong Kong may be characterized by 
paternalistic control by dominant owners, relative power distance and 
a sense of hierarchy limiting manager-worker interdependence.  This 
may indirectly explain the subordination of the role of broader 
shareholders in capital markets and corporate governance, and the 
entrenchment of the relationship between ownership and control.240  
Ruskola offered a three-fold typology of the business enterprise—
liberal, Confucian and socialist.  At risk of oversimplification, 
“liberal” firms prevalent in the West, on which the Anglo-American 
“theory of the firm” is premised, are organized according to the 
economic logic of contract, with each actor—managers, shareholders 
and workers—acting rationally in the pursuit of their respective self-
interests and the profit incentive.  In contrast, “Confucian” family 
firms—or what Ruskola has termed “clan corporations” —prevalent 
in Chinese businesses are organized on the fiduciary logic of kinship 
relations, which emphasize interpersonal hierarchies, long-term 
stability and non-confrontation, as opposed to individualism and 
short-term interests.241  The Chinese family firm has been said to have 
a management structure rooted in Chinese social history and tend to 
be run by dominant owners, who make all important decisions and 
are assisted by family members and trusted subordinates.  Corporate 
decision-making is embodied by a spirit of paternalism and conveys 
“the Confucian ideals of responsibility downwards in exchange for 
disciplined obedience upwards” and “[s]ocial respect is accorded to 
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owners, not employees.” 242   In a leading Singapore case on the 
common law derivative action, the Singapore Court of Appeal 
inferred that the influence of family relationships on business 
decisions cannot be discounted in an “Asian family which still tends 
to be rather clan-like, especially where the ties are through blood 
rather than marriage.”243 
Any discussion of culture, however, opens a Pandora’s Box 
of controversies as to its implications—what does one make of the 
influence of “Confucian paternalism” by corporate managers in 
corporate decision-making and its implications for executive 
remuneration, for example?  On the one hand, it suggests that the 
priority of the collective interest of the firm over self-interest would 
lead to self-restraint on the part of owner-managers not to extract 
beyond a fair share of their contribution to the firm’s value in view of 
the interests of other stakeholders.  Donald thus argues that the 
limited liability company originating from the West, which was 
designed largely to allow a firm to transact with the financial system 
and investors to profit from the firm’s business, should be adjusted to 
reflect the distinct corporate environment of Asia.  Values which a 
family might find important, such as firm autonomy, longevity or 
culture, are not taken into account in the Anglo-American corporate 
model which is premised on short-term value maximization of the 
firm. 244   This ostensibly suggests that regulatory restrictions on 
managerial discretion such as “say on pay” are unnecessary because 
owner-managers are able to make such decisions in the best interests 
of the firm. While this is a compelling argument, one finds it difficult 
to ignore the possibility of nepotism in an environment that 
emphasizes family loyalty and the risks of managerial 
unaccountability in a paternalistic hierarchical framework based upon 
power distance.  In an empirical study of 609 firms listed on the SGX, 
it was reported that companies, which disclosed employees who were 
family members of a director or the CEO and earned at least $50,000 
in annual compensation (as required by the Singapore Code of 
Corporate Governance), generally also paid higher compensation to 
directors and key management relative to market capitalization, 
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revenues and total assets. Such companies with higher compensation 
also tended to be less transparent in their compensation 
disclosures.245   This, the report noted, suggested that “companies 
with extensive family involvement in the business are less efficient 
or pay higher remuneration,” and it recommended that regulators 
“consider requiring or recommending the disclosure of the total 
remuneration paid to the controlling shareholder and family members” 
to provide stronger safeguards against excessive compensation in 
founder- and family controlled firms.246  The report’s author also 
noted that unlike in professionally managed firms where CEO pay is 
generally benchmarked with peer companies of similar industry and 
size, in family-managed firms, family shareholders generally have a 
great deal of influence over compensation, with remuneration 
consultants and independent directors having little influence.  This 
has often resulted in CEOs in family-managed firms receiving much 
higher compensation than their counterparts in professionally 
managed firms.247  The cultural emphasis on non-confrontation may 
also explain the passivity of shareholder culture particularly in 
Singapore, which may increase the risk of managerial opportunism 
and unaccountability. It has been observed that the shareholder 
community in Singapore does not generally monitor executive 
remuneration and tend to entrust the board of directors to oversee the 
firm in the belief that they would drive corporate performance in the 
firm’s best interests.  Intrusive questions from shareholders are 
therefore the exception rather than the norm.248  In this regard, both 
Singapore and Hong Kong challenge Roe’s “social democracy” 
theory which had suggested a binary distinction between social and 
non-social democracies and that left-leaning social democracies 
induce concentrated shareholdings in order to counterbalance the 
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influence of labor in firm management.249  Such a hypothesis cannot 
explain the positions of common law countries such Singapore and 
Hong Kong vis-à-vis the UK and the US, where concentrated 
shareholdings have arisen in the former in spite of the lack of the 
labor influence on corporate management or stakeholder orientation 
in their corporate governance. 
V. POLICY RESPONSES FOR SINGAPORE AND HONG 
KONG 
So long as these institutional arrangements in Singapore and 
Hong Kong discussed above persist in their current forms, which 
seem highly probable, “say on pay” is likely to be less effective as a 
means of mobilizing shareholder (and broader societal) opposition 
against high executive pay levels. Their attendant implications for 
regulatory reforms are also likely to continue.  In jurisdictions with 
concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders are liable to block 
legal reforms which restrict their private benefits, whereas in 
jurisdictions where dispersed ownership prevails, public institutions 
and the broader investor class are likely to have greater political 
influence to push for reforms to limit minority expropriation. 250  
Where such path dependence persists, it is said that they can only be 
overcome by sufficiently large efficiency gains251—if this is correct, 
the question is whether “say on pay” reforms may achieve more 
economically efficient outcomes on a relative basis for executive 
remuneration in the particular contexts examined. 
As the efficacy of legal mechanisms are closely related to the 
extent to which principals are capable of coordinating amongst 
themselves, one may anticipate institutional complementarities 
between share ownership structures and the types of mechanisms 
relied on to constrain agency costs.  Where such coordination costs 
are low, principals (i.e. controlling shareholders) are able to rely on 
less intrusive governance strategies to control managers, as opposed 
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to more robust regulatory strategies.252  Not instituting “say on pay” 
in such circumstances makes sense not least in respect of the 
regulatory and compliance costs which would be incurred by firms to 
hold a regular shareholder vote on executive remuneration. 
A. Institutional Complementarities and Path Dependence 
In view of the prevailing institutional complementarities in 
Singapore and Hong Kong, in respect of which key corporate 
institutions complement and derive their value, introducing “say on 
pay” may not lead to anticipated efficiency gains but instead result in 
unintended consequences later.  In this regard, it has been argued that 
several American mechanisms for shareholder power which have 
been transplanted to Asia, such as independent directors and 
derivative actions, have tended to turn into localized forms and bring 
unexpected consequences. 253   For example, as opposed to the 
conception of US-style independent directors as a watchdog for 
dispersed minority shareholders, independent directors in family-
controlled firms in Singapore might have ironically been used to 
reinforce controlling shareholder power by leveraging their close ties 
with family controllers to act as mediators in inter-family shareholder 
disputes and/or trusted advisors to the family chairman.254  Failure to 
adapt the legal rule to the local context is likely to lead to the creation 
of a “legal irritant” by irritating law’s “binding arrangements,” which 
sets off a whole chain of new and unexpected results.255 
In this regard, this article argues that such institutional 
complementarities in Singapore and Hong Kong include, in particular, 
the existing legal regime governing related-party transactions (RPTs).  
Currently, regulatory reforms in Singapore and Hong Kong are 
focused on improving the disclosure of executive remuneration and 
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strengthening the regulatory framework governing independent 
directors as the primary means of regulating managerial power and 
executive pay. 256   Strengthening the disclosure and independent 
director regimes may benefit minority investors to the extent that they 
may mitigate the information asymmetry with majority shareholders 
and serve as a check on insider directors.  Introducing “say on pay”, 
however, may eliminate any benefits arising therefrom by shifting the 
balance in favor of controlling shareholder power.  For jurisdictions 
characterized by controlling ownership structures, shareholder 
approval of remuneration is likely to be a mere formality, which 
would do little to curb pay, and instead further aggrandize majority 
shareholder power leading to the unintended consequence of 
permitting majority shareholder approval of excessive executive 
compensation at the expense of minority shareholders.  At the same 
time, it is doubtful if strengthening the disclosure and independent 
director regimes alone can work sufficiently to regulate 
compensation practices.  The different institutional settings in 
Singapore and Hong Kong encourage different economic incentives 
for executive remuneration in Singapore.  While controlling 
shareholders are able to use non-monetary incentives to align 
managerial interests with those of the firm, this may have the 
consequence (intended or unintended) of tying managerial interests 
with those of the controlling shareholders.257  As a result, boards in 
controlled companies are often dominated by insiders aligned to or 
affiliated with controlling shareholders who lack the independent 
capacity to exercise effective oversight of the compensation setting 
process.258  In such circumstances, the problems revolve less around 
excessive compensation per se but in ensuring that effective 
mechanisms are in place to tie managerial incentives with the long 
term interests of the firm as a whole.259 
Further, implementing “say on pay” reforms in Singapore and 
Hong Kong may undermine reliance on RPTs as a regulatory tool to 
protect minority shareholders.  The factors that appear to have led to 
the successful implementation of “say on pay” in the UK and 
Australia—including the presence of large institutional investors with 
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direct contact with corporations, which are willing and able to vote 
against a remuneration report—do not exist to the same extent in 
Singapore and Hong Kong at the moment.  Therefore, a “one size fits 
all” approach to “say on pay” is unlikely to be easily transferrable.260  
Regulators may continue to promote greater shareholder engagement, 
independent directors and improved corporate disclosure on 
remuneration practices as the less costly and more limited form of 
intervention, which would allow for greater flexibilities and latitude 
in remuneration-setting in concentrated ownership companies. 261  
This may allow for greater input by minority shareholders on 
remuneration matters but at the same time preserve the prerogative of 
the board and the majority shareholders in the remuneration setting 
process.  At the same time, however, the risks of the board becoming 
passive or captured by the majority shareholders increases with 
concentrated shareholdings.262  This creates the separate agency risk 
of “tunneling” or expropriation of minority interests by controlling 
shareholders, 263  and by extension, negative externalities at the 
expense of the interests of employees, creditors and broader 
stakeholders. 
On one view, a majority shareholder may—under certain 
circumstances—be better positioned to make credible commitments 
to workers, which may facilitate employee relations. 264   Others, 
however, argue that the presence of controlling shareholders 
increases the risk of exploitation of workers.265  It may also be argued 
that with ownership and control remaining firmly in the hands of 
families or the state, coupled with a cultural aversion to risk-taking, 
owners and managers in Singapore and Hong Kong are shielded from 
short-term capital market pressures, such as hostile takeovers, and do 
not feel the same pressure to meet quarterly performance expectations 
in the same way as American companies, with the result that a long-
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term view of shareholder value is taken. 266   In this regard, the 
presence of a block shareholder has been linked to significantly lower 
CEO pay.267 At the same time, the lack of a stakeholder orientation 
and a fluid labor market coupled with strong managerial and 
controlling shareholder power might mean that employee interests 
are less likely to be safeguarded in these contexts.268 
One, however, cannot overlook the risk of collusion between 
the board, management and majority shareholders.  Remuneration 
committees may not exercise effective oversight of remuneration 
because they risk losing their board seats if they object or are the 
beneficiaries of generous remuneration packages themselves; owner-
managers may in turn favor generous compensation packages to 
themselves and to professional managers who acquiesce to minority 
expropriation.269  This is especially since controlling shareholders are 
not generally subject to any fiduciary duties unless they are deemed 
to be acting as de facto or shadow directors.270  As highlighted by the 
OECD, the prevalence of controlling shareholders and corporate 
groups increases the importance of minority shareholder protection 
especially since related party transactions are a common business 
feature in Asia, which increases the possibilities of abuse.271  In Hong 
Kong, conflicts of interest are likely to arise between controlling and 
minority shareholders given the common overlap between controlling 
shareholders and board control, which increases the risks of self-
dealing.272  In its study of 412 public-listed Hong Kong firms during 
1995–1998, Cheung et al. found a positive relationship between cash 
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compensation received by the CEO and Chairman and their 
respective equity holdings for levels of shareholdings of up to 35% 
in small companies and 10% in large companies, with CEOs with no 
shareholdings receiving lower cash compensation compared with 
CEOs with share ownership.  The results were interpreted by the 
authors to suggest that the presence of information asymmetry 
between owner-managers and external investors may induce the 
former to invoke their shareholder rights to extract higher 
compensation for themselves. 273   Independent directors in Hong 
Kong and Singapore are also appointed with the support of 
controlling shareholders and are often affiliated with the incumbent 
directors 274 —in such circumstances, the presence of independent 
directors on the board may add little value as a source of 
monitoring.275   After a certain point, it is not clear if increasing 
disclosure requirements and the independence of directors would be 
effective in the face of opposition and stonewalling by concentrated 
shareholders with vested interests. 
B. Executive Compensation, Controlling Shareholders and 
Tunneling 
A more nuanced analysis of controlled companies indicates 
that block shareholdings may either be efficient or inefficient 
depending on, inter alia, the effectiveness of the regulatory regime.276  
In the case of efficient controlled shareholdings, the regulatory 
regime plays an important role in moderating the conduct of the block 
shareholders such that the benefits accruing from the ability of the 
block shareholders to monitor the managers are shared with the 
minority shareholders, and their private benefits of control do not 
exceed the benefits of monitoring management.277  On this basis, it is 
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argued that in addition to strengthening the disclosure requirements 
of executive remuneration in Singapore and Hong Kong, a more 
effective regulatory tool would be to reinforce the existing 
requirements of ex ante shareholder approval of RPTs, which are 
designed in response to the complex family and other structures in 
place. 278   An alternative would be to require a supermajority 
shareholder vote to approve remuneration packages to enfranchise 
minority shareholders.279 
Executive remuneration is currently generally exempt from 
the RPT requirements in Singapore and Hong Kong,280 but share 
options granted to a director and other relevant parties under a share 
option scheme of the listed issuer or any of its subsidiaries must be 
approved by independent non-executive directors (in the case of 
Hong Kong) and independent shareholders (in the case of 
Singapore) 281  In this regard, in its review of the RPT regulatory 
framework in Hong Kong, the HKEX took cognizance of the “say on 
pay” requirements introduced by the SEC in the US, but emphasized 
the prevalence of closely-held issuers in Hong Kong which merited a 
different regulatory approach.282  A recent study on Israeli companies 
shows that minority veto rights are effective in constraining the pay 
of controller executives.283  Further, the current difficulties in the 
private enforcement of shareholder rights in Singapore and Hong 
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Kong arguably justifies the use of ex ante governance measures with 
regulatory backing to empower shareholders, as opposed to ex post 
regulatory strategies such as the statutory derivative action to enforce 
minority protection rights.284  Singapore and Hong Kong further lack 
strong external governance mechanisms, which can alter the balance 
of power against controlling shareholders, such as US-style 
contingency fee-based shareholder litigation and class action regimes, 
and an active market for corporate control.285  In Hong Kong, no 
listed company was faced with an unfair prejudice claim from 2004 
to 2014.286  Singapore has also experienced a dearth of derivative 
actions against listed companies.287 
It may be argued that requiring “majority of the minority” 
(MoM) approval for executive compensation imposes unnecessary 
regulatory costs for companies given that the requirement of ex ante 
shareholder approval of RPTs are generally preserved for “significant” 
transactions not carried out in the ordinary course of business.  In this 
regard, “say on pay” rules were developed separately from the 
general rules on self-dealing transactions by the board of directors, 
presumably because shareholders might otherwise have to assess 
transactions, which, from the point of view of the firm, are routine 
and not significant.  As Davies noted, the exclusion of “say on pay” 
demonstrates that the basis of the general rules on self-dealing 
transactions in the UK Listing Rules is shareholder protection of 
large-scale firm expropriation rather than a policy of reviewing 
managers’ remuneration.288  It is also important to note that where the 
managers are (or are affiliated with) the controlling shareholders 
themselves, as is common in business families, executive pay would 
matter less as such managers would likely have other less visible 
means of self-aggrandizement such as through an increase in 
dividends or entering into ostensibly arms-length commercial 
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transactions with the company.  The difficulty therefore for the 
regulatory design is deciding what are the types and thresholds of 
executive compensation which may be deemed “value-destroying” 
and “unfair” (i.e. bad for shareholders and for society as a whole), 
along with the necessary carve-outs, within the specific contexts in 
Singapore and Hong Kong, respectively, in order to avoid 
unnecessary regulatory costs of impeding economically efficient 
executive compensation.289  Such reforms may be prudent especially 
because of the possible increase in shareholder participation in the 
future with the recent promulgation of the “Principles of Responsible 
Ownership” in 2016 in Hong Kong and the relaxation of proxy voting 
in Singapore, along with the increasing internationalization of the 
shareholder base and changing dynamics between companies and 
shareholders through new technological developments.290 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the preceding analysis of the current trends in “say on pay” 
regulation along with their implications for the traditional common 
law corporate model within the evolving capitalist framework, it is 
argued that the underlying capitalist institutions of political economy 
that support the regulatory state are better indicators over the 
prospects of the adoption and successful implementation of 
internationally prescribed standards governing executive 
remuneration.  As seen, the institutional settings in Singapore and 
Hong Kong are very different from those in the US and UK. These 
include the presence of concentrated ownership by families and the 
state, which discourages institutional shareholder activism, as well as 
a socio-political culture and ethos that militate against the prospect of 
taking into account broader stakeholder interests in pay governance.  
Shareholders—particularly majority shareholders—bear the direct 
cost of misaligned pay and inefficient managerial incentives, and are 
thus incentivized to choose optimal contracts.291  If so, “say on pay” 
regulation can only be beneficial and economically efficient when 
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there are market failures arising from the pre-existing institutional 
framework of remuneration-setting. 292   Imposing “say on pay” 
without regard to these institutional factors may demonstrate credible 
commitments on the part of the state to international investors but pay 
lip service to constraining executive pay and promoting executive 
accountability.  On this basis, it would be incorrect and over-
simplistic to claim that “say on pay” reforms are necessary to improve 
corporate performance as international “global governance” 
standards would suggest.  On the contrary, such reforms may lead to 
unintended regulatory consequences in Singapore and Hong Kong by 
either having no or little effect on restricting executive remuneration.  
Such reforms may even lead to shareholder acquiescence or 
encouragement of misaligned executive remuneration, especially 
considering that the efficacy of “say on pay” reforms in providing for 
economically efficient executive remuneration in the US and UK are 
still inconclusive to date.293 
At the same time, these same institutional factors, which 
militate against the likelihood of the successful regulatory adoption 
of “say on pay” in Singapore and Hong Kong, are also reasons why 
further regulatory reforms may be necessary to prevent the “tyranny 
of the majority (shareholder).”  The presence of controlling 
ownership by family groups and the state give rise to the potential for 
separate agency costs by increasing conflicts between controlling and 
minority shareholders, and between shareholders and broader 
stakeholders (in particular, employees). 294   In this regard, the 
necessity of “say on pay” reforms would depend on the extent to 
which executive remuneration in Singapore and Hong Kong continue 
to be effectively regulated in the future under the existing frameworks 
pursuant to the requirements relating to remuneration disclosures and 
independent directors, as well as the manner in which executive 
remuneration continue to rise out of alignment with firm value.  If 
these trends suggest the necessity for further regulation, requiring 
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separate MoM approval for certain prescribed thresholds and types of 
executive compensation which fall within the category of undesirable 
RPTs may serve to empower the minority to prevent potential 
disguised tunneling.  Concurrently, this avoids the disruption of 
existing shareholding structures by keeping management power in 
the hands of controlling shareholders and possibly incentivizing them 
to act in the firm’s interests.295  One may also consider the possibility 
for the firm to conduct a separate supermajority shareholder vote to 
determine if minority shareholders may choose to opt-out of such a 
regulatory requirement on an ex ante basis, especially since the 
necessity for such MoM approval may depend from firm to firm with 
different business practices and the types and configuration of 
shareholders therein.  Such ex ante governance measures are 
particularly important in view of the weaknesses of ex post regulatory 
measures currently in place in Singapore and Hong Kong, given the 
difficulties in shareholder litigation in both jurisdictions. 296   This 
calls for a well-calibrated regulatory design by ensuring that the 
benefits of requiring MoM approval outweighs the regulatory costs 
of conducting a regular MoM shareholder vote for what are otherwise 
routine transactions which are normally carried out in the ordinary 
course of business.297 
The foregoing suggests that the presumptions underlying 
orthodox corporate governance theories such as the “Varieties of 
Capitalism” theory,298 Roe’s “social democracy” theory,299 and the 
“law matters” theory300 are useful only as starting points, but are 
insufficient on their own to explain or predict regulatory reforms, 
particularly in the Asian context.  Ultimately, the prospect of 
regulatory convergence depends on the degree in which the 
divergences in the institutions of political economy amongst common 
law systems reflect variances not with reference to a standardized 
governance metric, but rather differences in objectives which each 
jurisdiction expects the corporate governance framework to 
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achieve. 301   Put simply, one has to examine each corporate 
governance system on its own terms and not simply with respect to 
an overarching theory that purports to be all-encompassing.  
Regulatory divergences thus reflects differences in the social and 
economic priorities which each jurisdiction seeks to manage through 
the fluctuating balance of power amongst executives, investors, 
employees and above all, the state, within the respective corporate 
governance systems with reference to the diversity in historical, 
cultural and political contexts. 302   This implies that corporate 
governance reforms should accommodate these circumstances in a 
manner that provides the right incentives for both entrepreneurs and 
investors to contribute to capital formation, the efficient use of capital 
and market competition.303  Only then would policymakers provide 
market participants with a sound basis to exploit new business 
opportunities and innovate in a globalized economy, and ensure the 
most economically efficient allocation of capital and corporate 
resources, which ultimately contribute economic value for the 
corporation’s stakeholders and broader society.304 
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